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ABSTRACT
As the technological revolution advanced information security evolved with an increased need for confidential data protection on the internet. Individuals and organizations
typically prefer outsourcing their confidential data to the cloud for processing and storage.
As promising as the cloud computing paradigm is, it creates challenges; everything from
data security to time latency issues with data computation and delivery to end-users. In
response to these challenges CISCO introduced the fog computing paradigm in 2012. The
intent was to overcome issues such as time latency and communication overhead and to
bring computing and storage resources close to the ground and the end-users. Fog computing was, however, considered an extension of cloud computing and as such, inherited the
same security and privacy challenges encountered by traditional cloud computing. These
challenges accelerated the research community’s efforts to find practical solutions. In this
dissertation, we present three approaches for individual and organizational data security and
protection while that data is in storage in fog nodes or in the cloud. We also consider the
protection of these data while in transit between fog nodes and the cloud, and against rogue
fog nodes, man-in-the-middle attacks, and curious cloud service providers. The techniques
described successfully satisfy each of the main security objectives of confidentiality, integrity,
and availability. Further we study the impact of rogue fog nodes on end-user devices. These
approaches include a new concept, the Fog-Federation (FF): its purpose to minimize communication overhead and time latency between the Fog Nodes (FNs) and the Cloud Service
Provider (CSP) during the time the system is unavailable as a rogue Fog Node (FN) is being ousted. Further, we considered the minimization of data in danger of breach by rogue
fog nodes. We demonstrate the efficiency and feasibility of each approach by implementing
simulations and analyzing security and performance.
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Introduction

1.1

Introduction to the Research Problem
Since the beginning of the 21st century, popularly known as the internet revolution

age, the world has seen swift changes in terms of processing and storage facilities. This has
been attributed to consumer demands as a result of the dynamism surrounding computer
technologies. This makes the new computing resources very affordable and widely accessible
than during any other human age [1][2]. One element of the computer technologies revolution
is the cloud, whereby the cloud computing model has gained popularity as a result of the
on-demand services it provides, such as storage over the internet to the end-users [3][4][5].
The popularity among the consumers and end-users can be attributed to its accessibility,
scalability, and reasonably priced packages. As mentioned above, cloud computing has been
largely utilized for storage and therefore providing solutions to individuals to store their
data safely and securely in the cloud [6][7][8]. Beyond storage, cloud computing is also
used for other computing services such as networking, databases, providing intelligence, and
analytics. Therefore, organizations and individuals have resorted to the use of cloud storage
in place of local storage. One of the advantages of this computing resource is that data can
be processed regardless of the size of data or the software or hardware needs. It also is secure
as data is backed up safely in the cloud. There are, however, drawbacks associated with this
form of computing service.

1.1.1

Drawbacks of Cloud Computing
Cloud computing, though important in the aspects of storage, also has its limitations

that can reduce efficiency in its operability. One of these drawbacks is the issue of high end to
1

end delay, also referred to as high latency. High latency is actually unavoidable, especially in
the public cloud due to the high number of users and also due to differences in geographical
locations for end-users. This form of latency is the delay that occurs when a user requests
a cloud service provider [9][10]. These delays cause a slowdown in communication and a
high number of users in public clouds worsens the situation accelerating data delays causing
communication overhead [11].
Another drawback concerns security for end-users’ data and privacy, which are prone
to malicious violations. This violation can occur as the data is being transported or during
the process of cloud storage. Cloud computing is known to possess a weakness of having semitrusted third parties who can control the cloud [12][13]. Access control can be advantageous
and also disadvantageous in cloud computing. The drawback of access control in cloud
computing is that organizations or individuals have limited to no control over the data or
the security [14].
Secure processing and data storage for individuals and organizations pose a huge
challenge for users as they are concerned about their data security. Security issues concerning
data are important to both software and hardware. This has led to the implementation
of cryptographic systems and algorithms to handle security and privacy issues in cloud
computing. The problem of latency with relation to cloud computing is not well resolved;
therefore, it is a gap for technological innovation [9][15]. The issue of latency is a problem
for individuals and organizations because of delays and timeliness. This can be a problem,
especially during retrieval of data such as medical records data for patients, hence influencing
the provision of quality services for clients [9].

2

1.1.2

Fog Computing and Related Issues
The various issues concerning cloud computing such as high latency led to the intro-

duction of fog computing in 2012 by CISCO [10]. Although cloud computing has assisted
individuals and organizations to a wide array of computing resources, the time needed to
access cloud applications can be too long and, therefore, may not perform well when needed.
This also applies to communication overhead problems, which are resolved through fog computing [9][15]. Due to the dynamism of technologies and the changing needs of consumers,
and the amount of data being generated and the rising number of devices connected need
cloud resources to be on the edge, which is close to the user for easy access [15]. Fog computing, more importantly, provides linkages between the cloud and end-users such as through
Internet of Things (IoT) nodes [16]. Therefore fog computing helps with issues of latency by
offering low latency, high bandwidth, security, location awareness, network load efficiency,
real-time, capacity to process a high number of nodes distributed appropriately, and finally,
mobility [17][18].
Fog computing aides computing, storage, networking, and management of data near
IoT devices to enhance access for users [17]. Therefore, this enhances the security and privacy
of the users through measuring, processing, and analyzing devices [13][19]. Fog computing
is an extension of cloud computing [19]. Fog computing achieves this through the numerous
edge nodes that send data directly to IoT devices. This can also cause issues while data
travels through the different fog nodes that help to transit the data to the end-users.
Because fog computing is an extension of cloud computing, there is the issue of
’inheriting’ problems related to security and privacy from cloud computing. Security and
privacy challenges can occur while data moves from the Fog Nodes (FN) and Cloud service
provider. Privacy can also be manipulated while data is being stored. Security of data
must target to avert the loss of integrity, loss of availability, and loss of confidentiality.
3

Manipulation of data can be in many forms: 1) A fog node can go rogue and expose sensitive
data in transit. 2) End-users’ confidential data can be compromised when fog nodes are
compromised through malicious attacks. 3) Interception of private data by malicious party
in transit between fog nodes and end-user, or between fog nodes and the cloud. End-users’
confidential data could be accessed by malicious unauthorized actors through rogue fog
nodes, hence breaking the data security goal of confidentiality. This brings up the element
of man-in-the-middle (MITM), who is a malicious attacker who intercepts communication
between end-users and fog nodes. Encryption and integrity check algorithms can be applied
to enhance the integrity and thereby, privacy. Access keys should be robust to prevent
MITM attacks such as brute-force-attack that uses the trial and error method to gain access.
Additionally, cryptographic keys should never be handed to the cloud service provider as
curiosity can lead them to access data, hence breaking user confidentiality. Therefore, this
research considered the protection of end-users’ confidential data through the provision of
data security from rogue fog nodes, man-in-the-middle attack, and curious cloud storage
provider/administrator in the context of fog computing.
Fog computing has a vital feature of reducing time latency that exists between cloud
providers and end-users’ devices (such as IoT devices). Fog nodes are location-sensitive,
and therefore, each must serve the intended purpose for users in that location; however, fog
nodes can fail, and this can consequently disrupt computing services. This means that user
access will be limited by the failed fog node. This calls for the development of approaches
or techniques or even systems to ensure the continuity of system processes such as storage
even with a failed fog node.
Communication overhead includes the time used to complete assigned work. Communication overhead issues should be reduced in order to lower latency. This could be between
the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) and also Fog Nodes (FNs). Therefore, reducing the com-

4

munication time between FNs and CSP through different approaches such as Fine-grained
data access control in CSP and FNs can aide in subsiding the latency in the fog computing
system. A fog node is used to transfer data from the end-users to the cloud. In the process, it
can be difficult to protect other fog nodes not being in use at that particular moment in the
process of transit. A malicious attacker can use this weakness as his/her point of attack and
illegal access. Therefore, an attack on the fog node would negatively influence the security
of users’ data. The same case applies if the fog node goes rogue. This can be, however,
resolved through the use of secure communication methods in order to transfer data to and
from fog nodes securely and without the worry of compromise by fake end devices.
For that reason, it is essential to design methods for the purpose of shielding users’
data by keeping it confidential and available by ousting rogue fog nodes. From the discussion
above, we can deduce that there are two forms of threats. 1) Data modification which occurs
when an malicious third party is able to access end-users’ private data. In this process, the
attacker violates their confidentiality and integrity. 2) Unauthorized access; which occurs
when an attacker disrupts a fog node. This can result in exposure of a user and their
confidential private data leading to a breach in data security. Additionally, data availability
will be hindered in case a malicious attacker accesses data that was in transit. This makes
the availability of data an important aspect of data security and privacy.

1.2

Research Overview
This section will provide a summary of the contributions of this dissertation. We

have offered three research contributions to the issues surrounding data security through the
recommendation of approaches.
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1.2.1

An Encryption-Based Approach
The application of fog computing has been majorly on streaming, whether it is video

streaming or playing games online. Such applications require the use of fog computing
because the fog nodes are located near the user hence significant for quick decisions such
as in health care services [10]. A Fog computing system presents diverse security matters
besides the numerous benefits that it provides for users. A fog node, for example, needs to
be active for it to perform its intended task. If it is not, then, end-users cannot get value
of the features provided by fog computing. If a similar occurrence of having an inactive fog
node happens in a healthcare facility, a malicious attacker may intercept data and risk the
confidential patient data. It also could cause high time latency and communication overhead
to retrieve end-users’ data from the cloud.
These issues have not been addressed by previous literature in the context of fog
computing; hence it creates a research gap that is addressed in this approach.
This approach, therefore, proposes an Encryption-Based-Approach, a method developed to hinder unauthorized access of encrypted data by rogue fog nodes through the development of fog-federations. This ensures that data security goals of availability, integrity,
and confidentiality are upheld. End-users need to be protected from attacks on their confidential data as well as be protected from the irregularities that occur when rogue fog nodes
attack other fog nodes. For example, rogue FNs may deceive other FNs to breach end-users’
private data. Fog Nodes (FNs) also need to communicate or store data in the cloud without
the problem of communication overhead and also latency. The idea of Fog-Federation (FF)
allows the organization of Fog-Nodes (FNs) into arrangements referred to as Fog-Federations
(FFs). Grouping is in relation to the attributes they possess, such as location attributes and
classification by the form of services they provide, therefore, restricting the rogue Fog-Node
(FN) from accessing encrypted data stored whether in the cloud or other FNs in the same
6

FF. The stratification of files before encryption is for tracking purposes while assessing their
individual needs. Every group has its specific set of attributes (e.g., locations and services).
Also, every fog node serves only one group and cannot be applied for any other purpose. It
will, therefore, remain intact even if an FN from another different group is retracted. Reencryption in this case applies only for that one group accesses files. This process enhances
time management, hence low latency is achieved. This is achieved by dividing files to be
encrypted into blocks of the same size and equipping the Cloud-Service-Provider CSP) with
a tracking table to track each FN current possess blocks and needs. Rogue/malicious FN
will not be able to access the data stored in the CSP or other FNs in the same FF upon the
re-encryption process.
This will be broadly discussed in Chapter 3 through the introduction of its objectives,
design, algorithms, simulation, and experimental evaluation.

1.2.2

Multi-Level Approach
Fog computing has revolutionized the idea of computing faster and efficiently through

the numerous resources it makes accessible to users. The various security issues limit these
benefits that fog computing is meant to provide, especially if the fog node goes rogue or is not
working. For this problem, we came up with a proposal of the Fog-Federation (FF) in 1.2.1.
This approach would work by preventing fog nodes from violating the user’s data security.
Rogue and malicious fog nodes are ejected to ensure that integrity and confidentiality are
conserved by inhibiting them from gaining access to the encrypted data kept in the cloud or
in other FNs in the same FF group. This cuts down on access time and hence time latency
and communication overhead between FNs and the cloud.
FF enhances capacities in terms of data aggregation, processing, and, finally, the
storage aspect. These aspects can become problematic because there is a possibility of an FN
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accessing all the data encrypted with the set attributes for that specific FF. In this situation,
if one of the FNs in the FF goes rogue, there is a possibility of breaching confidential and
encrypted data.
Other potential security concerns related to fog computing is data hijacking that
results in breaching of data or loss of data. This can happen in different ways, such as
malicious actor taking charge of the intercepted fog node or obtaining data maliciously from
the fog node. Also, a fog node might go rogue. In this case, end-users’ data security would
be in danger of being breached. A fake fog node, once it has access to private data, can
breach confidentiality and violate data integrity as private data will be at risk.
To address these issues, we propose this approach as a method that categorizes the
FNs found in FF into Fog-Federation-Subgroups (FFSGs) to reduce the amount of data
has a possibility of being breached by the rogue fog nodes. In this case, files are divided
into three blocks whereby each block is available if FNs meet the established FFSG attributes—therefore meeting the data security goals (e.g., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) for protection against security issues related to fog nodes such as the rogue fog nodes,
Man-in the Middle Attack and the curious cloud service provider.
This approach, therefore, has filled the gap of having no literature in the exact topics,
as discussed in the context of fog computing. Thereby, Chapter 4 provides a depiction of the
FFSG concept, multilevel objectives, the multilevel approach design, the designed model,
and the algorithms intended to accomplish the objectives related to the proposed approach.
After that, a performance evaluation will be available. It contains the correctness of security
analysis, the multilevel approach design, and our performed experiments to demonstrate the
feasibility and applicability of our approach. Later, discussion and conclusion parts will be
provided to provide a summary of the approach.
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1.2.3

A Blockchain-Encryption-Based Approach
Blockchain related approaches provide security and a fine-grained data access scheme.

The discussed approaches above intend to get rid of rogue fog nodes that hinder the security
of data. However, these methodologies are dependent on third parties for the execution and
also are not able to differentiate between a legitimate and a rogue fog node. A blockchain,
therefore, plays a role in preventing FNs from violating the security of data for the user,
especially when an FN has been ousted. Also, they lack tracking the identity of legitimate
FNs in the same FF and what encrypted data they are allowed to access. Fog nodes are
classified into fog federations depending on their attributes (e.g., locations and services).
In Blockchain-Encryption-Based Approach, authorization occurs in a distributed manner, and they also have the capability of providing every fog node with an off-line database
that keeps the recently accessed data to accurately track the encoded data and inhibit other
FNs from altering the tracking data and, also an on-chain database that now protects data
from being interfered with by rogue fog nodes. Therefore, the blockchain is unique in that it is
an ‘interfere free’ system. This approach also reduces time latency and communication overhead, which involves the Cloud-Service-Provider (CSP) and FNs through off-line database
tracking. This approach further exploited and sought to incorporate the blockchain technology with the Ciphertext-Attribute-Based-Encryption algorithm. In this case, blockchain is
used in an on-chain file tracking-table for verification before any access is accorded to the
data. Also, each fog node would be identified using the smart contract before any access on
the CSP. Blockchain, therefore, provides services not provided by other approaches and is
therefore feasible.
A more detailed discussion is provided in chapter 5, broadly discussing the idea behind
the use of blockchain and the approach’s objectives. Chapter 5 also provides an illustration
of the proposed approach in full details together with assumptions made to achieve the
9

objectives. It also discusses the threat model and designed algorithms. Then, chapter 5
provides performance evaluation and security analysis. The final parts are the discussion
and the conclusion of the chapter.

1.3

Conclusion and Dissertation Outline
This chapter provides a short analysis of the aspects surrounding security and pri-

vacy issues in fog computing while considering the approaches that might be applicable for
mitigating the security concerns. This chapter presented the research problem and a summary of the dissertation’s contributions. Chapter 2 discusses the background of the topic as
well as related literature. Further, chapter 3 provides a discussion of the Encryption-Based
approach, chapter 4 introduces the Multilevel Approach, and finally, chapter 5 discusses the
Blockchain-Encryption-Based Approach. Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation.
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2

Background and Literature Review

This dissertation focuses on multiple purposes regarding the security of data in the
environment of fog computing. The first purpose addresses security issues and proposes
methods to secure fog-computing through approaches intended to satisfy the information
security goals (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) for data while being in transit
or during computation/storage in fog nodes or cloud. The second purpose is to provide a
discussion of security issues rogue fog nodes could cause to end-users’ confidential data and
prevent them from breaching these confidential data. Thereafter, this dissertation focuses
on providing approaches to detect and oust rogue fog nodes with maintaining data security.
Finally, we discuss the secure communication among fog nodes in a trust-less environment.
In this chapter, advanced cryptographic primitives will be reviewed and exploited to
achieve the proposed approaches, as well as the blockchain technology. This is followed by
a broad study of the literature’s approaches that have been developed for managing rogue
fog nodes and protecting and securing data in fog computing. Subsequently, we provide
a critical analysis of the current approaches for protecting data security in fog computing.
Finally, a conclusion summarizes the dissertation.

2.1

Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) Algorithms
In this section, we reviewed the literature of cryptographic and technological primi-

tives we exploited in this dissertation. We start with the Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme
(ABE) as we adopted the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) algorithm in our approaches.
ABE was introduced by Sahai and Wates in 2005, as an amendment of the identity11

based encryption [20]scheme. In this scheme, every user who accesses the system has a set
of attributes assigned to him/her. This scheme aims to support users and owners in sharing
or distributing confidential data with others, depending on the access policies they provide.
Encryption is usually undertaken depending on the receivers’ attributes, which makes ABE
algorithms broadly applied to perform multiple encryption processes.
According to Hohenberger and Waters [21], ABE guided by available user attributes,
allows users to encrypt and decrypt messages. ABE is one of the cryptographic schemes
that ensure fine-grain data access control in cloud computing. One of those ABE schemes is
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE). The attribute-Based Encryption
(ABE) is an advanced cryptographic primitive that can be utilized to run multiple encryption
systems. In ABE systems, the ciphertext can be encrypted to multiple recipients depending
on the predefined attributes of the recipients [22]. In this cryptographic system, for example,
ABE, the private keys assigned to users, and ciphertext are related to a predefined formation
of attributes or an arrangement of policies over attributes [23]. Users that fulfill the attributes
associated with the ciphertext have the right to access the ciphertext.
There are two variants of the ABE system: ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [24] and key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [25]. The CP-ABE
variant has been further explored and described below.

2.1.1

Ciphertext-Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE)
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption is a system that provides complex ac-

cess control on data to limit compromising of the data in the cloud storage. In CP-ABE,
users’ private keys are linked with a set of attributes, while ciphertext is linked with an
access structure constructed over the predefined attributes. Encryption occurs depending
on the credentials described by users; therefore, users are identified using their specified
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attributes, making it hard for malicious users whose attributes are not described to access
data. Therefore, users are unable to gain access to encrypted data unless their attributes
mathematically align with the access structure. CP-ABE is fundamentally comprised of four
algorithms:
1. Setup: It takes security parameter as input to produce a public key and a master key
(P K, M K).
2. Encrypt: The inputs are described as attributes, public parameters, and the message,
while its outputs are ciphertext CT . No user can decrypt CT unless their inputted
attributes fulfill the requirements of the access structure A in the policy. The ciphertext
implicitly contains A.
3. KeyGen: In this algorithm, the inputs comprise the master key and a set ‘S’, a block
of attributes descriptive of the key. A private key SK is generated.
4. Decrypt: It takes the public parameters P K , the Ciphertext CT , and the private
key as inputs. The output is the message (e.g., plaintext) generated if the inputted
user attributes meet the requirements of the access structure A attached to CT .

2.1.2

Bilinear Mapping
As described in [20], let G1 and G2 be a cyclic mathematical groups, multiplicative, of

large prime order p, with g as a generator. Also, Let e be a bilinear map: e : G1 XG1 → G2 .
Such that, G2 is the output space of the bilinear mapping. Therefore, bilinear map e must
comply the following conditions:
1. Bi-Linearity: ∀ u, v ∈ G1 , e(ua , v b ) = e(u, b)ab where a, b ∈ Zp∗
2. Non-degeneracy: No pair in e : G1 XG1 is mapped to the element of identity .
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3. Computability This means that the bilinear map e(u, v) must be efficiently computable.

2.1.3

Access Structure
With reference to [26], let the set {P1 , P2 , ..., Pn } be a set of parties. We can say

that collection {A} ⊆ 2(P1 ,P2 ,...,Pn ) is monotone if ∀ B ∈ A and B ⊆ C then C ∈ A. In this
scenario, the collection A of non-empty subsets of {P1 , P2 , ..., Pn } is considered a monotone
access structure. ∀ sets ∈ A, they can be referred to as authorized sets while the parties ∈
/A
are the unauthorized parties. As same as provided in [22], our approaches also represent the
parties with attributes; all fog nodes with the same attributes will produce a fog federation
(FF). Therefore, as described further in chapters 3,4, and 5, the fog nodes with similar
attributes were categorized into fog federation subgroups.

2.2

Blockchain Technology
Blockchain technology has shown a promising and flourishing future for applications,

especially for recording data such as transactions. The history of blockchain shows that many
non-financial applications are adopting it besides the cryptocurrency [27]. For example,
blockchain has been used in healthcare, agriculture, the food industry, and many other
applications. A blockchain fundamentally allocates record database for all transactions as
implemented and shared among contributing parties [28]. Every transaction in the public
register is substantiated by consensus favored by the majority of the parties in the system.
When information is entered and proofed, it cannot be erased or changed. Blockchain
has developed to be a widely available infrastructure for the expansion of decentralized
applications. Those applications constructed on the blockchain can attain components such
as immutability, integrity, transparency, and non-repudiation [29].
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2.2.1

Smart Contracts
Blockchain assists users in applying parts of software, usually known as smart con-

tracts. The blockchain technology is comprised of three generations that enhance their
operations and include: money transaction, assets, and smart contract. Blockchain was first
published by Satoshi Nakamoto [30], but at that time, it was focused on money transactions only. Thereafter it began focusing on exchanging assets among different parties [31].
Blockchain has been enhanced by introducing the smart contract concept [32]. These pieces
of software are usually seen by everyone in the network as described in [32], and must be
controlled by the network parties.
Smart contracts work through self-execution of contracts whereby users use codes on
their contracts found on a blockchain [33]. Through smart contracts, transactions are made
safe for users, such as in banks, through their applications. Smart contracts, therefore, store
valuable data safely and can be retrieved. However, the issue of security is present due to
the fact that most blockchain systems are in the public domain; therefore it is susceptible
to malicious attacks [33]. In this dissertation, we adopted the smart contract concept in our
third approach, see chapter 5. For further reading about blockchain and smart contract,
read through [34][35].

2.3

Fog Computing
Fog computing is also known as fogging and is like an extended form of cloud com-

puting. The difference between fog and cloud computing is that in fog, data is processed
locally while in the cloud, it is sent to the cloud [36]. The concept was first introduced by
Cisco in 2012. When describing fog computing, we should visualize the mid-layer that falls
between cloud computing providers and devices employed by end-users, including PCs or
other devices [10]. Fog computing is therefore, closer to the end user than the cloud comput15

ing. Fog computing enables computation, storage, and data management to be shifted close
to the ground, reducing time latency and communication overhead between the far cloud
computing providers and end-users’ devices. Fog computing sorts out the issue of having
data so close to the data source. For example, compacting the GPS data can be flowed at
the edge of the system before being transferred to the cloud in Intelligent Transportation
Systems [37].
The OpenFog Consortium in 2016 defined fog computing as: ”a horizontal systemlevel architecture that dispenses computing services, storage, control and networking tasks
nearer to the users along a cloud-to-thing continuum.” In the following section, we define and
discuss fog computing services with relation to computation and storage, and the associated
features. The security issues in fog computing will also be reviewed as well as a critical
analysis of fog nodes.

2.3.1

Fog Computing Services and Characteristics
This section summarizes fog computing services and the associated characteristics for

organizations and individual users.

2.3.1.1

Services

Due to the significant distance between the cloud data center and the end-users’ devices, cloud computing suffers from end-to-end delay, traffic congestion, and communication
overheads [38]. Cloud computing cannot be used for activities such as real-time activities
e.g., gaming; therefore, fog computing comes at play. It gets its name from fog, which is
a cloud that is usually located near the ground. It is applied in smart home applications
which are becoming common especially when a wide variety of services are needed in one
application such as home security systems which involve numerous aspects such as alarm,
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cameras and recorders, motion sensors and aspects such as key in locking system or even face
recognition sensors. Fog computing also provides services in data management, especially in
the healthcare industry[39]. This is because of the sensitivity that surrounds medical records
and related data. Each provider, therefore, will possess a fog node that has medical data for
that specific patient, and this can be stored in a smartphone.

2.3.1.2

Characteristics

Fog computing was formerly initiated by CISCO to provide the following characteristics [10][40]:
1. Support End-users’ devices mobility.
2. Real-time applications rather than group processing to ensure timely service.
3. Low time latency between the far cloud providers and end-users. Latency in the form
of execution time, offloading time for a task, and the speed of decision making.
4. It provides location awareness and distribution.
Due to immense support from big information technology companies such as CISCO, Dell,
Microsoft Corp., Cloudlet, and Intelligent Edge, fog computing has a promising future.

2.3.2

Security and Privacy Issues in Fog Computing
Fog computing is faced with security and privacy challenges that change every time

due to the dynamism of the IT systems. Previous measures utilized in cloud computing are
not applied to fog computing because of the characteristics associated with fog computing
[17]. As described in the previous section, fog computing has features that distinguish it
from cloud computing such as: Low latency, support of the geographic distribution, end
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device mobility, the capability of processing a large number of devices, wireless access, realtime use, and heterogeneity [17]. The security vulnerability of fog computing is certainly
high as it exists in a principal network for end-devices and cloud. The Research community
acknowledges that security and privacy issues for fog computing should be dealt with. However, current literature has discussed data security issues related to fog computing in terms
of data security objectives (Confidentiality, trust, Integrity, and Availability), data access
control, and communication security among fog nodes, and DoS attack.

2.3.2.1

Data Security Violation in Fog Computing

End-users utilize devices the Internet of Things (IoT), laptops, servers ...etc. in
processing, transfer, and storage of confidential data. Privacy and security for end-users is
a challenge as devices transmit confidential data to fog nodes for processing and further to
the cloud where extended processing and storage occur. In the process, end-user security
and privacy compromised as sensitive data may be collected. This confidential data is
susceptible to malicious compromises. These privacy and security issues may occur through
the interception by malicious third parties or by fog nodes or cloud services providers. The
vast distribution of fog nodes also makes centralized control difficult. The fog node can
also turn out to be malicious or rogue, which would result in the violation of end-users’
confidential data while traveling through the malicious fog node to the cloud and from the
cloud. Data can also be compromised if a fog node was poorly installed, inviting intrusion by
a malicious actor. This is known as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack- which violates data
confidentiality, trust, and integrity in an unapproved manner. A provider of cloud services
may exhibit curiosity about the aspects surrounding outsourced encrypted data resulting in
a violation of data security and privacy. Additionally, new challenges in security and privacy
have emerged. Ni et al. in [41] recommended the concept of Fog-based Vehicular Crowd
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Sensing (FVCS) whereby these can store data momentarily in order to offer local services
and also to play the role of cloud servers. The exchange of data about local situations can
expose location data for the user [17].
Security requirements cannot be offloaded. Securing communication among the fog
nodes themselves is a significant security issue. The fog nodes require an effective way to
exchange data in a secure mode without violating data security. Data availability and low
time latency found in the exchanges between the cloud and end-users’ devices would be
enhanced in this way. Fog nodes interact with one another when there is a need for network
management. Additionally, when two fog nodes aim to exchange confidential data, they
must have a safe way of protecting sensitive data from being exposed to malicious entities
that might carry out unauthorized changes to the data being transferred. The fog node
that seeks to retrieve data from another fog node must be certain that the fog node it is
communicating with is legitimate; otherwise, the end-users’ data security will be maliciously
violated. Communication amongst fog nodes needs to be secured as the nodes utilized in
the multi-hop route may be untrustworthy [17]. Research communities have studied these
security concerns and have come up with different schemes to defend these confidential data,
whether being in transit or in storage.
A Rogue fog node by definition, is a fog node that seems to be legitimate, but is,
in reality malicious. A rouge fog node in fog computing is a device that is attempting to
imperil a legitimate fog node [42]. Additionally, when a devices is damaged by malicious
actors or invaders and acts as a genuine fog node in the fog network, provoking a connection
by the user, it too becomes rogue [42]. It introduces, to the fog network, incorrect data either
purposely, with harmful intent, or as a result of faulty devices in the system. Any fog node
that has become rogue is, therefore, considered to be an entity of malice in fog networking.
The existence of a rogue, or fake, fog node causes a massive risk to end-user’ data
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privacy and the general security in the fog computing network. An example of this is when a
malicious user influences a legitimate fog node in an insider attack, whereby a legitimate fog
administrator knowingly or mistakenly introduces a rouge fog node instead of a legitimate
fog node. Malicious node or rogue node will try to produce dissimilar attacks to get a trust
value by familiarizing the system with its attributes. In this case, rogue fog nodes have the
capacity of accessing end-users’ cloud stored, encrypted data or encrypted data stored in
other fog nodes.

2.3.3

Security Oriented Approaches to Protect Data in Fog Computing
This section investigated three areas: data security and access control in fog comput-

ing, rogue fog nodes and secure communication, and data exchange among fog nodes.

2.3.3.1

Security and Access Control In Fog Computing

The research community has presented different schemes such as Wang et al. [43],
Wang et al. [44] and Goyal et al. [25] through the adoption of Attribute-Based Encryption
schemes in the cloud computing storage and processing environment. Cloud storage means
that security can become a challenge through external and internal threats. Yu et al. [45]
proposed attribute-based data sharing with attribute revocation. Attribute revocation is
about the dropping of some attributes by the user, an action that limits access to the
system [46]. It was demonstrated to be resilient to selected plaintext attacks founded on the
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption [47]. A drawback of this revolved
around the element of key generation, encryption, and decryption computation processes
included in all likely attributes in the universe of attributes. As a result, this scheme had a
computation cost liability on users.
Li et al. [48] proposed a new data sharing scheme, attribute-based, in a bid to sort
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out the challenge and possibility of ineffective data security. They would accomplish it by
changing part of the system into offline status. Therefore, before decryption begins, the
development and inputting of a public ciphertext would be carried out in a bid to reduce
high computation overhead. Offline ciphertexts shield the ciphertext produced when the
system goes online.
Tysowski et al. [49] recommended a scheme that would work by combining cryptographic primitives, namely CP-ABE and proxy re-encryption, to achieve a user revocation
process. They separated users into groups; each group of users shared a similar secret key.
However, the scheme was made vulnerable to a collusion attack by making all users in the
same group share and use the same private key.
ABE cryptographic schemes have been applied by researchers in cloud computing to
enhance security and enable fine-grained data access control of outsourced data. Like every
system, the ABE scheme also has its downsides. High computation overheads is one of the
issues , which burdens the inadequate resources accessible to end-user devices as encryption
and decryption process occur. A scheme proposed by Yu et al. [50] would ensure security
as well as fine-grained data access control in cloud computing. This would work through
the delegation of tasks to an untrusted proxy server. The process includes the combination
of three elements; proxy re-encryption, lazy re-encryption, and KP-ABE in order to design
a scheme that is characteristic of fine-grained data access control. All but one (dummy
attribute) user private keys were stored in the cloud.
Another study conducted by Green et al. [21] provided a new prototype for ABE
that would eliminate the involved overheads for ABE, such as time-related drawbacks or
those related to size. This can be achieved through outsourcing of decryption into the cloud
server. A single transformation key can enable any form of action about time and size. A
blind secret key was issued to a user using a random choosen number that was hidden from
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the user. The covered key with the server to execute a decryption that had been outsourced.
Other researchers have come up with some schemes, such as Ning et al. [51], who introduced
schemes with white-box traceability with the capability to trace malicious attackers. Ning
et al. [52] introduced the use of large universe ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
and the potential to trace users who maliciously sharing their private keys.
Additionally, Li et al. [53] adopted a system centered around CP-ABE to accomplish
efficient revocation of user keys with the likelihood of subcontracting, to cloud servers, the
encryption and decryption processes. Huang et al. [54] proposed a scheme allowing the
sharing and accessing of data to accredited users, collectively. This scheme is based on the
CP-ABE, and ABS in fog computing, whereby sensitive data received from the Internet of
Things devices are encrypted with a handful of policies then released to servers in the cloud.
The user who has attributes that content with the policies released can alter the decrypted
data and re-outsource.
ABE systems have had the weakness of not having a hierarchical filing system based
on ABE systems in cloud computing; therefore, having the limitation of disorganized files
in the cloud. This gap led Wang et al. [55] to propose a scheme for files hierarchy access
control based on attribute-based encryption. The layers access structures are incorporated
into a one single access construct.
Many schemes, therefore, have been proposed to enhance the operability of ABE
systems. Kaaniche et al. [56], saw the need to have privacy-preserving mechanisms and,
therefore, proposed an encryption-based multilevel access policies scheme using ABE systems
to enhance selective access to encrypted data based on users’ granted access rights. An
owner of encrypted data has the power to determine who will access that data through the
use of privacy-preserving mechanisms. This model is highly applicable to cloud computing.
However, it does not put into consideration the aspect of sharing data on fog nodes that
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service the end-users.

2.3.3.2

Security and Access Control In Fog Computing

Security and privacy issues are expected in Fog Computing, some of which have been
existed in cloud computing platforms while others are new [42]. When exploiting fog nodes
in developed systems, it is crucial to consider the threats to end users’ data security and
privacy and secure it. When talking about security concerns in this research, we mean access
control, rogue fog nodes, and trust issues among fog nodes and between fog nodes and cloud
service provider/end-users.
Researchers have applied ABE to devices from IoT to resolve issues of data access
control. The FDAC scheme has been proposed by Yu et al. [16] to attain fine-grained data
access control and the issues that arise in wireless server networks. In the FDAC scheme
proposed, each sensor node is assigned a specific set of attributes, while each user was
allocated an access structure that contained access rights for that particular user. Similarly,
another method was proposed by Hu et al. [57] whereby users with wearable devices were
studied to assess the aspect of communication security that existed between the users and
the device, in a wireless body area network. A safe and secure scheme was implemented
through the influence of CP-ABE in WBAN. Besides, Jiang et al. [58] pointed out the issue
of key-delegation abuse in the ABE system and specifically a CP-ABE scheme. He, therefore,
came up with a CP-ABE scheme that would trace traitors and misuse of delegating access
keys in fog computing.
Another access control scheme was proposed in 2018 by Zuo et al. [59]. This scheme
named CCA-secure ABE scheme to ensure the security of outsourced decryption to ensure
that the data is secure. Regrettably, this scheme came with high computational costs,
and only performed with the integration of AND-gate encryption attributes. Xiao et al.
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[60] also recommended another hybrid fine-grained search and admission authorization for
fog computing, which would be built on a CP-ABE cryptographic primitive. This scheme
reinforced both index encryption and data encryption making it hybrid. It also reinforced
AND-gates bases. Consequently, Mao et al. [61] proposed a generic anonymous identitybased encryption with ciphertext security to ensure confidentiality and anonymity associated
with ciphertext attacks.
Recently, researchers have started adopting ABE algorithms into fog computing to
resolve issues involving data confidentiality and fine-grained access control. Li at el. [62]
proposed a time-domain multi-authority outsourcing attribute-based encryption scheme for
acquiring data in edge computing. This will boost data security and users’ privacy in edge
computing. Edge computing moves computing and storage devices near the user to save
on time and cost. In this context, encryption attributes have been divided into two parts:
time attribute and universal attributes. Time-domain attributes were combined with the
encryption algorithm. This scheme, therefore, works by outsourcing computation to edge
nodes for increased security and operability.
Xu at el. [63] proposed PMADC-ABSC scheme that controls data access founded
on Ciphertext policy ABSC to offer a fine-grained control mechanism as well as a multiauthority data access control scheme for fog computing. The recommended structure based
on Multi-authority Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Signcryption (ABSC) supports the
outsourced processing for data users and owners. In this structure, parameters are managed
by a central and trusted authority. The drawbacks in this scheme are the high levels of
computation and communication overhead.
Dsouza et al. [64] proposed policy management of resources needed for fog computing.
This scheme would ensure the security of collaboration activities and enable interoperability
among different users in fog computing. This framework comprises of a set of rules, attributes
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repository, and an administrator that work at different levels to enforce capability policies.
A Fog Computing-based Security (FOCUS) is a system proposed by Alharbi et al.
[65] to prevent Malware attacks on the Internet of Things (IoT) devices. They would use a
virtual private network (VPN) to safeguard communications channels to IoT devices. They
also protect against DDoS attacks through the use of a challenge-response authentication
technique. Traffic analysis and firewall were also placed into consideration as IoT devices
validate each other using a challenge and response method. Traffic analysis through FOCUS
can identify malicious or suspicious activities and sources as they are labeled. The source
has to pass the set test to attain access to the VPN.
Imine et al. [66], proposed the implementation of new authentication protocols because traditional authentication protocols had issues related to latency and lack of mutual
identification. These new authentication schemes would mutually identify users through information inputted concerning that user and the identifiable attributes. A fog node usually
upholds a blockchain and enables users to validate any fog node. Fog nodes are also able to
authenticate each other.
Research community has developed distinct systems to deal with challenges to allow
different user’s access sub-parts of the encrypted data according to their access policies in
cloud computing.
Similarly to cloud computing, fog computing stores data for users in fog nodes. In
Alotaibi et al. [67], an attribute-based data sharing scheme was proposed in relation to
fog computing. Data sharing has its challenges, and these would be addressed using ABE
systems and proxy re-encryption. Through this scheme, the owners of data can encrypt and
provide their access policies of the users who have the right to access the encrypted data.
Specifically, a Key-Policy Attribute-Based encryption and proxy re-encryption mechanisms
were considered by Alotaibi et al. [67], so that fog nodes will carry out re-encryption processes
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without revealing the data. Data users whose attributes fulfill the access policies can access
the encoded data and provide security in communication and data sharing.
Zhang et al. [68] proposed an access control Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based encryption scheme in fog computing. This scheme would promote outsourcing capacities as
well as attribute update for fog computing. This would involve a redefinition of the access
structure to alter the attributes as well as generate ciphertext partially. Besides, it enabled
data owners to delegate part of the ciphertext generation into the fog nodes. The reason is
to handle the issue of time that is usually needed to encrypt, decrypt as well as updating
the attribute is very long. The adoption of this scheme would reduce time and make it to
be constant.
Fog computing is likely to be faced by authentication issues and authorization challenges that might arise once in a while. Stojmenovic et al. [69] provided an understanding
of authorization and authentication issues in fog devices and between fog and cloud through
the ABE algorithm. They provided an argument that end-users would still be authenticated
and authorized into fog devices even when there was proof of vulnerability of the connection.
The study also assesses different forms of attacks such as typical attacks and man in the middle attack. Similarly, Li et al. [70] proposed a framework for the collection of smart devices’
attributes and incorporating them with the ABE algorithm to validate access authority in
real-time. Existing schemes are assessed and compared with the new schemes to assess vulnerabilities that could result. Mollah et al. [71] proposed a lightweight cryptographic model
to offer a mechanism for control of access sharing of data. It has all security operations
unloaded to nearby fog servers. A search scheme proposed would enable a user to search
data either in their storage or on shared storage systems securely without an interception.
Mohammed et al. in [72] proposed a lightweight revocable hierarchical ABE scheme.
This is a scheme that embraces Attribute-Based Encryption for IoT that can benefit from

26

the cloud systems as the cloud will carry out on its behalf the most expensive operations
(e.g., encryption and decryption operations) without prior knowledge of the features of the
underlying data. This scheme also employs the hierarchical model to enhance flexibility such
that attributes can be handled using different authorities.
Blockchain is a widely used method for enhancing the privacy of systems and reducing
tampering. This scheme was proposed by Guo et al. [73] in an attempt to authenticate
the outsourced decryption of attribute-based encryption (ABE) through the inclusion of
blockchain into fog computing. Blockchain help to guarantee the validity of outsourced data
to limit invasion. An additional authentication layer in decryption operations would verify
the precision of the ciphertext by the data users. Blockchain technology keeps data that
are used for verification. That would assist in inhibiting inside or outside attackers from
meddling with the available data.
When enabling data sharing among multiple actors, it is imperative to consider that
one of those actors become rogue/malicious. As end-users outsource confidential data to fog
nodes then to the cloud, if one of those fog nodes goes rogue or were maliciously compromised, the end-users’ confidential data would be at risk from being maliciously breached.
Therefore, this paper focuses on reducing the amount of data rogue fog nodes can breach in
fog computing, in the case of a federation of fog nodes.
Rogue fog nodes can pretend being legitimate, to be trusted, where they strike once
the system has trusted them. They can be of different forms, such as an access point (AP),
fog node, or Internet of Things (IoT), according to Alrawais et al. [74]. Our work focuses,
therefore, on the minimization of data that is in the danger of breach by rogue fog node.
After scanning the literature, we found that rogue fog node has not been studied in the
context of fog computing.
An interesting perspective that would assess authentication protocols was proposed
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by Ibrahim [75], whereby fog users and fog nodes would need to authenticate each other
mutually at the edge of the network. This scheme would have a random user roam the
server. Therefore, fog nodes will be required to keep credential information on attributes for
all users so that they can identify each other with the attributes stored. This scheme did not
put into consideration the aspect of a selfish fog node that becomes rogue and even attacks
other good fog nodes, an element that our study has considered.
Technological advancements require us to be innovative to ensure that problems that
arise have solutions developed. The application of ABE systems in the real world has seen
innovations in the transport systems. The use of VANETs would enhance communication
between vehicles and also communication between the vehicle and infrastructure. This information was provided by Al-Otaibi et al. [76]. They targeted developing a scheme for the
detection of vehicular rogue fog nodes with the fog computing paradigm. This scheme would
limit traffic data exchange among vehicles, and at the same time allowing roadside communication through roadside units (RSU). Through this important scheme, roadside units also
capable of identifying vehicles that provide false data to enhance the privacy of a vehicle.
Another author in [77] also came up with a similar proposal like that of Al-Otaibi
described above. He raised the concern of security of VANETs whereby some malicious
parties may violate the privacy of a user. To counter this, he proposed a threshold anonymous
announcement model to detect rogue users by enabling the receiver to check the information
provided by the sender (other vehicles) and choose to either accept or reject the projected
information. The role of this scheme is to meet the goals of dependability, privacy, and
audibility.
A rogue fog node imitates the genuine to demand the sharing information from other
fog nodes, end-users devices, or the cloud. The primary, and hidden, intent is to violate
owners’ data security and privacy and retrieve important information that could jeopardize

28

the security of the user. For example, the use of debit cards can be maliciously attacked,
and information such as Personal Identification numbers intercepted. Having control of
compromised a fog node, an attacker can infringe the privacy of end-users’ data as it transits
the fog nodes to the cloud. This issue has been widely researched with almost 2,500 journals
and scholarly articles on the same.
Man in the Middle attacks are one of the most frequent attacks in the security of
computers. A middle malicious party intercepts communication between users or user platforms [78]. Since fog is known for its close proximity to the end-user, they are bound to
have frequent and are more susceptible to attacks than in cloud computing. Stojmenovic
et al. [19] suggested a scheme to show the probability of a man-in-the-middle attack in
which the gateway is either being compromised or replaced by a fake one. The threat of
Man in the Middle attacks has been widespread because of the spread of WLAN networks
in public places. This scheme led to the proposal by Han et al., [79] on the utilization of
a measurement-based scheme to aid users to stop connections to fake access points. This
system identifies the rogue AP by computing the time taken between end-users and the DNS
server.
To create an efficient and effective fog computing environment, it is essential to ensure
the security of the devices used in transmission. The idea of a cyber-security framework was
proposed by Sohal et al. [80], a framework that works by detecting and recognizing malicious
control devices at the edge of the network, popularly known as outside device attacks. This
identification is critical in the securing of fog computing platforms. Therefore, they proposed
the inclusion and use of three frameworks that would work effectively if applied concurrently
and in the real environment. These include the Hidden Markov model (HMM), Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS), and Virtual Honeypot technologies for their framework [80]. The
HMM would be used to recognize and classify edge components. At the same time, the
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Virtual Honeypot technologies would work by keeping and sustaining the log comprising
all earlier detected malicious components. This scheme is important as it helps the system
develop a self-defense mechanism from known and unknown malicious attacks. Finally, the
IDS is the genesis of identifying suspicious events and ensuring that they are malicious.
However, they can sometimes produce false positives, which is why other frameworks, as
mentioned above, have been applied.
One of the most significant problems that bother network administrators is the presence or possibility of rogue access points, as pointed out by Shivaraj et al. in [81]. They
thereby proposed a methodology known as the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to detect
the presence of rogue AP in the WLAN. This approach is applied passively in two stages.
The first stage involves training HMM and another, which is detection based on the trained
HMM. Data is usually attained through routers, whereby assessment is done on packet arrival times to determine any dissimilarities. This method proposed in [81] is very efficient in
that rogue access points can be realized within seconds.
Insider data thefts can result in leakage of confidential data, and therefore defense
mechanisms need to be adopted as control is of such attacks is almost impossible [82].
Stolfoet et al. in [83] developed an approach that is able to detect and handle insider data
theft attacks in the cloud. They concentrated on user performance profiling and decoy
technology to monitor user data access patterns into the system. Therefore, if a user with
malicious intent were sensed by the technology, which operates by profiling user behavior, it
would then send the snare document to that user.

2.4

Recommendations
The critical question that no researcher has explored is how to mitigate the effects of

rogue fog nodes on encrypted data stored in the cloud storage or fog nodes. This research
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tries to address the study gap about security issues related to rogue fog nodes, as previous
literature has not discussed in the environment of fog computing. Therefore, the absence
and inconclusiveness of research about security issues facing fog nodes in previous studies
renders the current literature incomplete and limited. This omission must be managed the
context of fog computing.
However, this leads us to the primary aim of this research. It investigates all issues facing fog computing paradigm and, consequently, recommends approaches that can
minimize the impact of rogue fog on the data security of end-user transfers of information
between fog nodes and the cloud Service Providers (CSPs). The main focus of this research
is to assess fog nodes and cloud storage platforms and the approaches to ensure the data
security of end-users.

2.5

Conclusion
In this chapter, we reviewed the background of the cryptographic primitives and

technologies exploited in this research. This chapter included the application of ABE systems
through the adoption of Ciphertext ABE systems. Besides, we reviewed the blockchain
technology as we exploited the idea of smart contracts in our work. The background of fog
computing was reviewed while considering the services it offers and associated security and
privacy issues. Then, a discussion of security issues of fog computing was carried out. Finally,
a survey of the literature of the Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) schemes developed by
researchers to provide data security issues in the cloud and fog computing paradigms was
undertaken. Several considerations need to be made before selecting the mitigating methods
for rogue fog nodes, which are majorly related to the specific privacy or security issue.
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3

An Encryption-Based Approach

In this chapter, we developed an Encryption-Based approach to protect fog federations
from rogue fog nodes. Sections that are shown in this chapter has been published in [84]
verbatim.

3.1

Introduction
The cloud computing paradigm, over the past few years, has gained a well-respected

reputation due to the tremendous on-demand services it provides to end users over the
internet. Cloud computing has innovative features— availability, scalability, and economy—
that help to meet the huge demand for storage and computation resources [6]. End users
can remotely store and process their data in the core network on the cloud, but it is stored
far from users; therefore, the time between a user request and the cloud response is high.
Thus, there is a demand for new technology to resolve the cloud latency issue [9][15]. With
huge growth in the use of the cloud and outsourcing data to the cloud, cloud computing can
expose users to various challenges such as data access control, data security, and high latency.
However, the fog computing paradigm emerged in 2012 [10] to reduce latency between the
cloud and end users’ devices [9][15]. The fog computing paradigm locates a cloud close to the
end-users’ devices, which enables customers to perform computing at the edge of the network
[10]. In the context of fog computing, fog nodes provide resource services to end-users [16].
The main distinguishing features of fog computing include mobility, location-awareness, and
low latency [18][42]. The research community has examined the topic of access control in
cloud computing, but that is not the focus of this chapter. For a comprehensive overview
of access control, read [85][50][86]. The fog computing paradigm is susceptible to different
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threats ranging from malicious attacks to technical issues. Therefore, our focus of this
chapter is to demonstrate ways to oust rogue (malicious) fog nodes that present threats to
fog computing. One reason for these vulnerabilities is that end-users outsource sensitive
data to a nearby fog node to be processed and then sent to the cloud. Since these fog nodes
are the connector between end-users’ devices and the cloud, it is challenging to secure the
cloud and other fog nodes from malicious attacks. This reveals a need to protect the owner’s
sensitive data from being compromised. In general, fog computing threats take two forms:
1) Data modification: if the adversary gets ahold of the fog node, he/she might violate the
user’s data confidentiality/integrity. Thus, it is important to introduce a security technique
to check data confidentiality/integrity among fog nodes as well as between fog nodes and
the cloud. 2) Unauthorized access: when a fog node is compromised, an adversary can
get his/her hands on users’ sensitive data. Therefore, it is essential to define a security
approach to revoke(oust) the fog node as soon as it goes rouge for whatever reason. To
defend users’ data security while continuing the low latency that fog computing provides,
there is a fundamental demand for a security approach that will meet the users’ security
needs. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a cryptographic primitive that enables oneto-many encryption. It consists of two types: ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption
(CP-ABE) [24] and key policy attribute-based encryption [25]. CP-ABE, introduced by
Bethencourt at al [24], is one of the most cryptographic approaches, providing fine-grained
data access control. In this chapter, we present a CP-ABE based approach to oust (rogue)
malicious fog nodes and minimize the communication overhead between the cloud service
provider (CSP) and fog nodes (FNs).

Contribution This chapter presents a secure and fine-grained data access control approach, based on CP-ABE algorithm[24], which achieves the following features:
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• Classifying the fog nodes (FNs) into different fog federations(FF) depending on FNs’
attributes —namely, location and provided services.
• Ousting a rogue (malicious) fog node (FN) that acts maliciously, so it cannot access
the encrypted data in cloud.
• It directly prevents the departure FN from accessing encrypted data in the cloud or
in other FNs in same FF, besides it helps remaining FNs to access re-encrypted data
with no latency.
• It helps in reducing communication time to transfer files from the CSP to FNs. The
FN divides the file into multiple blocks. The CSP tracks what each fog node currently
has/needs. After the re-encryption process, the CSP sends the needed block to the
legitimate FNs. This feature makes our approach time efficient.

3.2

Classifying Fog Nodes into Fog Federation
The Encryption-Based Approach was based on classifying the Fog-Nodes (FNs) into

Fog-Federations (FF) based on their locations, and services they provide to end-users,
Fig. 3.1. A FN can belong to multiple FFs based on its attributes, therefore it can access the data encrypted to the FFs’ attributes where it belongs. For example, Fig. 3.1 shows
that FN1 belongs to FF1 and FF2 . In this case, FN1 is capable to access data encrypted
to both FFs. The benefit of FF here is to manage the FNs accessibility to encrypted data
stored in the Cloud-Service-Provide (CSP). Fog computing was proposed to deal with the
time latency issue between end-devices and the far cloud. Therefore, researchers have seen
bringing the computing and processing close to end-devices would be helpful. However,
what if the fog node serving a certain region is down or goes rogue. This means end-users
have to get back to the far cloud to outsource or retrieve their data. In another word, it
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Figure 3.1: Fog Federation Concept.

means the computing and processing would move back to the far cloud. In this approach, we
strongly believe that the FF concept would help in keeping the computing and processing
services close to the ground with defeating the rogue fog nodes from accessing the encrypted
data stored on the cloud or in other FN in the same FF. However, FF concept is a great
contribution to FNs management.

3.3

An Encryption-Based Approach Objectives
In this section, we present a description of the objectives of Encryption-Based Ap-

proach in aspects to confidentiality, integrity, availability, and performance.

3.3.1

Confidentiality
Encryption-Based Approach provides and guarantees data confidentiality as follow.

The encrypted files/blocks in the Cloud-Service-Provider (CSP) or Fog-Nodes (FNs) are protected against ousted fog nodes by the following process: when updating the Fog-FederationList (FFL), the TAS updates the System Public Key (SPK) and propagates it through a
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secure channel to fog nodes that are not yet members of the FF. In the meantime, it sends
notifications to the CSP to re-encrypt the files encrypted with a specific FFs attributes, and
it notifies the fog nodes remaining in the FF to update their secret keys. In this case, the
ousted fog node does not have the SPK and, therefore, cannot update its private key for a
future decryption process. This feature makes this approach robust against unauthorized
fog nodes. In addition, when a FN receives a request from another FN in the same FF, it
verifies the request using the digital signature [87]. Once the remaining FNs and the CSP
receive the updated SPK, the ousted FN (rogue/malicious FN) becomes unable to forge the
signature to retrieve encrypted files/blocks from either the CSP or FNs. In this senario, the
end-users’ data confidentiality is preserved against rogue FNs.

3.3.2

Integrity
Encryption-Based Approach provides data integrity by hashing [88] each block of

the files to be encrypted. Then, it outsources these blocks along with their hashes into the
cloud service provider (CSP) for storage. Encryption-Based Approach is eventually capable
of verifying whether a potential damaged block is corrupted or not. If a downloaded block is
corrupted, Encryption-Based Approach can report the corrupted block to the CSP to mark
it as damaged block. This approach allows the FNs in same FF of checking the block/blocks
integrity by calculating the decrypted blocks hashes, if matched, it is verified; otherwise it
is not.

3.3.3

Availability
Encryption-Based Approach provides data availability for end-users’ by classifying

Fog Nodes (FNs) into Fog Federations (FF) based on their attributes. Fog computing
emerges to solve the time latency issues between end-users and the cloud service provider.
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However, if the FN providing services to end-devices in its region goes rogue, or is being
down or maliciously compromised, the fog computing roles will be dysfunction in this case.
In particular, end-users encrypted data retrieving must be from the far cloud. One great
advantages of the Encryption-Based Approach is to let fog nodes (FNs) in same Fog Federation (FF) to serve users in same region. In this scenario, the FN stores the retrieved files for
a period of time in order to make it closely available to end-users and other FNs ion same
FF. On the other hand, FNs must flush their storage in a specific time in sake of maintaining
data security as FNs might unexpectedly go rogues.

3.3.4

Performance
One of the Encryption-Based Approach objectives is to reduce the communication

overhead between the CSP and the FNs. The CSP and FNs exchange encrypted messages.
The Encryption-Based Approach divides the message into blocks before encrypting and
uploading the blocks to the CSP. At the same time, the CSP maintains a progress list which
helps to track the needs of all FNs in each FF. When a FN in a specific FF needs to decrypt
a file, the CSP will check the progress list in case some of the intended file’s blocks have
already been shared with another FN in the same FF. If that is the case, the CSP directs
the requester to contact the FN in the same FF to get the needed blocks. This feature gives
the Encryption-Based Approach more momentum as it plays a vital role in reducing time
latency between the CSP and the FNs.

3.4

Overview of the Encryption-Based Approach
As Fig. 3.2 illustrates, the Encryption-Based Approach comprises of the following

entities: a Cloud-Service-Provider (CSP), Fog-Nodes (FNs), and a Trusted-Authority-Server
(TAS). Fog-Nodes (FNs) with same attributes form a Fog-Federation(FF). Time latency to
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Figure 3.2: The Encryption-Based Approach System Model.

deliver data from cloud storage to end users’ devices is high; therefore, fog computing emerged
to address this issue. However, FNs are susceptible to malicious attack, and accordingly the
end user’s confidentiality could be violated.In order to maintain the confidentiality, integrity
and availability for end-users’ outsourced data traveling through FNs to CSP, we utilized
the following advanced cryptographic primitives: CP-ABE algorithm, which enforces finegrained data access control to guarantee a secure communication between FNs and the CSP,
and hash function and digital signature concepts to guarantee data integrity. This approach
equips each FN with a set of attributes and associates each ciphertext with an access policy
that is defined by these attributes. Only a FN that satisfies the access policy structure
Table 3.1: Progress List
FNID
FN1
FN2

FileID
File1
File1

Available-Blocks
B1
B1 ,B2 ,B3

Needed-Blocks
B2 ,B3 ,B4 ,B5
B4 ,B5
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associated with the ciphertext can decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext.
This approach classifies the FNs into different fog federations (FFs) based on a set
of attributes which characterizes the FF. Consequently, we let the FN divide the file to
be encrypted into blocks, then perform the hashing, and encryption processes, and finally
outsource it into the cloud storage. More specifically, CSP maintains a progress list, which is
a list of all FNs in a specific FF besides blocks of files they currently need/have, Table. 3.1.
Such a construction reduces the file retrieving and decryption time. For the sake of clarity,
we will consider the following example:
Suppose File1 is encrypted and uploaded to the CSP. FN1 and FN2 already have
accessed some blocks of this file. Suppose FN2 becomes unauthorized to decrypt this file
for any reason whatsoever. The TAS simultaneously notifies the remaining FNs to update
their private keys and notifies the CSP to perform a re-encryption operation. The CSP
then defers re-encrypting blocks already shared with any FN in the FF. It instead starts by
re-encrypting the blocks that have not been accessed yet and then re-encrypts the ones that
were already shared. This feature boosted this approach’s success as it is designed to reduce
the time latency when retrieving files from the cloud. When an authorized FN accessed an
encrypted file, the CSP checked the progress list and accordingly returned the file or the
blocks that had not been accessed by others in the same FF. Then, the CSP returned a list
of FNs and which blocks they already had. Then, the FN, which requires the encrypted
file, communicates the FN in the same federation to get the intended blocks. Thus, the
time consumption to retrieve the encrypted data from FNs in same FF was much less than
retrieving the same file from CSP , so this approach provides low latency and less traffic
overhead between the FNs and the CSP. This is attributed to the idea of fog federations
(FF).
A FN could leave the system for whatever reason, or it could go rogue by being
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compromised by a malicious attack. Thus, to guarantee the owners’ data confidentiality
there was a need to take precautions against the rogue FN. This approach efficiently acts as
a barrier against an ousted fog node to keep it from accessing the encrypted data stored in the
cloud. This approach was designed to instantaneously and simultaneously prevent the ousted
FN from accessing the encrypted data and delivering the re-encrypted data to the remaining
FNs. Fog Federation-updating, and re-encryption algorithms were executed by TAS and
CSP in a parallel manner: TAS excluded the ousted FN from the Fog-Federation-List (FFL).
Then, it updated the current Fog-Federation-Public-Key (F F P Kver ) to F F P Kver+1 , then
propagated F F P Kver+1 to the FNs remaining in the FFL. CSP started re-encrypting the
files which could not be decrypted by the ousted FN. The re-encryption key was F F P Kver+1 .
In addition, this approach was designed to maintain data integrity which protects
encrypted block/blocks from being damaged while in transit or in storage. This was achieved
by calculating the hash of the decrypted blocks when retrieving encrypted data either from
the CSP or other FN.

3.5

Threat Model
The Encryption-Based Approach presents three security models that reflect the fol-

lowing cases:

3.5.1

Rogue Fog Nodes
The fog node was called rogue when it seems acting appropriately, but it was acting

maliciously. When it comes to real application, rogue fog nodes would badly affect the
computing ecosystems in different ways. For example, suppose we have a Fog-Federation
(FF) of Fog-Nodes (FNs) that share same attributes. Accordingly, FNs in the same FF
can access the same data encrypted to the FF’s attributes. The question is: what if one
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of those FNs in same FF goes rogue, this would lead to breaching the confidential data
that must be kept secret, is not it? The idea of FF is centring about minimizing the time
latency between the Cloud-Service-Provider (CSP) and the end-users, but with considering
the rogue fog nodes issues. In case a rogue fog node manages to continue retrieving the
encrypted files/blocks from the CSP and from other FNs in same FF, this would lead to a
major violation to the end-users’ data confidentiality and integrity.

3.5.2

Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack
A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack occurs when an attacker intentionally inter-

cept the traffic between two parties to modify the communication between them. In the
Encryption-Based Approach, Fog-Nodes (FNs) in same Fog-Federation (FF) exchange confidential data among them and with the Cloud-Service-Provider (CSP). Therefore, this approach aims to protect end-users’ confidential data from being damaged or exposed by the
MITM attack.

3.5.3

Curious Cloud Service Provider
The Encryption-Based Approach intends to secure end-users confidential data against

the rogue FNs and the CSP as well. In this approach, we consider the Cloud-Service-Provider
(CSP) partially trusted as it could violate end-users’ data security by handing it to unwanted
third party. This is because the CSP was run by companies which not fully trusted to endusers. The aim of this approach is to prevent the CSP from inferring the stored encrypted
data.
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Figure 3.3: Encryption-Based Approach Access Structure.
3.6

Design of the Encryption-Based Approach Algorithms
In this section, we present the description of the Encryption-Based Approach based on

the CP-ABE algorithm, hash function and digital signature concepts. We begin by reviewing
the access tree model presented in [24][25] as we exploit it as an access structure as shown in
Fig. 3.3. Then, we describe our algorithms. To satisfy the access tree conditions, we follow
the same methods in [24][25]. Read through [24][25] for more information. Next we provide
the algorithms needed for the Encryption-Based Approach.
Algorithm 3.1 which based on [24] is executed by TAS. It inputs a security parameter
and outputs System Public Key (SPK) along with System Master Key (SMK). It constructs
a universal set of attributes to be used in our approach as USAT = FN Location, Service
Provided.
TAS also executes Algorithm 3.2. Its input is SPK. It contains two parts. First: it
creates a new Fog-Federation-List (FFL) of FNs depending on the provided location and
services. It contains hash of F NID and F FID to prevent against id-impersonation. Second:
when TAS receives a request from FN to join the system, TAS will check a predefined FFL. If
FN-Attributes (F NAtt ) are suitable with one or multiple fog federations attributes (F FAtt ),
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Algorithm 3.1 Setup (λ)
1: Choose bilinear cyclic group G1 of prime order p with generator g1 ;
2: Randomly generates exponents α, β ∈ G∗p ;
3: Random Oracle H: U SAT → {0,1}∗ // to map each att in USAT into random element
∈ G1 ;
4: SMK and SPK as:
5:
SM K = {β, g1α }
6:
SP K = {G1 , g1 , g1β , e(g1 , g1 )α } ;
7: USAT = FN location, Services
8: The SPK is public to all fog nodes, but SMK is private for TAS
it will be added to the corresponding Fog Federations. Otherwise, it will create new FF
and add the new FN to it. Additionally, this algorithm outputs fog federation master key
(FFMK), which is only available for TAS, and fog federation public key (FFPK) that is
public to the federation’s members.
Algorithm 3.3 is also executed by TAS which is based on [24]. It takes as inputs
FFMK, SPK, FNID , SMK and a set of attributes S. In this algorithm, the set S along with
the FID identify the FN’s private key (F NP R−S−ID ). F NID is used here to assign each fog
node with a distinct private key and to track each FN’s activities. It outputs F NP R−S−ID .
The F NP R−S−ID is associated with FN attributes and FNID simultaneously, and this helps
in preventing an unauthorized fog node from accessing data stored in the CSP.
Authorized FNs executes Algorithm 3.4 which is based on [24]. This algorithm takes
the file to be encrypted (M), the access tree T , SPK, and F F P K as input. It outputs
the ciphertext to be uploaded to the CSP. In our approach,the FN divides the file to be
encrypted into multiple blocks (M1 , M2 , . . . ., Mn ). Then, it encrypts all blocks and uploads
the ciphertext to the CSP.
CSP executes Algorithm 3.5. Our approach is designed to reduce the communication
overhead between the CSP and the FNs. CSP maintains a progress list as shown in Table-1.
CSP will check the progress list upon receiving a request from an authorized fog node. In
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Algorithm 3.2 FF Creation and Adding new FN (SPK)
1:

2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:

Part 1: FFL Creation
Create FFL to contain list of FNs in the system,as
F F L[F FID |F F P Kver |F Fatt |H(F NID F FID )]ver
Part 2: Addign New FN to FF
if F Natt = F Fatt then
assign new-FN F NID = F NID + F FID
add FN to the corresponding FF
send F F P Kver to new FN
else
create new FF and assign it unique F FID
randomly choose F F M Kver = γ ∈ Zp∗
Compute F F P Kver = {F FID , g1γ , e(g1 , g1 )γ }
assign F NID = F NID + F FID
add new FF to FFL
add new FN to new FF
send F F P Kver to the new FN
end if

Algorithm 3.3 F NP R Generation (F F M Kver , SP Kver , SM K, S, F NID )
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:

TAS gets request from new FN to join the system
if F NID is verified then
continue
else
decline
end if
randomly generate r ∈ ZP∗
for every atti ∈ S do
randomly generate ri ∈ ZP∗
end for
for every att ∈ S do
compute F NP R−S as follows
F NP R−S−ID = (D = g (α+r)/β , ∀i ∈ S : Di = g r .H(F NID )γver .H(i)ri ,
0
Di = g ri .H(F NID )γver )
13: end for
14: send F NP R−S−ID to the corresponding FF and update FFL
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case the requested file or some blocks of it has/have already been accessed by other FNs in
same FF, the CSP will notify the requester to communicate which FNs have those blocks.
But in case the file has not been accessed by any FN in the same FF, the CSP will send the
file to the FN.
Each authorized FN executes Algorithm 3.6 which is based on [24] to obtain plaintext.
Its inputs are the current ciphertext, the current version of the FNP R−S−ID , the defined
attributes in the access structure. The decryption algorithm outputs either plain-text or ⊥.
In (1), we associate the fog node private key with F NID and F Natt set to prevent a fog
node’s impersonation. The FN performs decryption for each block and then combines all
the decrypted blocks to form the plaintext file.
TAS and CSP simultaneously execute Algorithms 3.7 and 3.8. TAS would oust a FN
from the system for multiple reasons (e.g. being attacked or becomes a rogue FN). Thus,
to guarantee the owner’s data security, there is a need to take precautions against those
ousted FNs. Our approach efficiently prevents an ousted FN from accessing the encrypted
files stored in the CSP. To prevent an unauthorized FN from accessing the encrypted files,
Ousting rogue FN and Ciphertext Re-encryption algorithms are executed simultaneously by
TAS and CSP, respectively. More specifically, such feature ensures that our approach is
secure. TAS will exclude the ousted FN from the FFL. Then, it will update the current
FFPKver to FFPKver+1 and propagate FFPKver+1 to the FNs remaining in the FFL. CSP
will start re-encrypting the files, which cannot be decrypted by the ousted FN. The reencryption key is FFPKver+1 . The CSP starts re-encrypting the files/blocks that have not
been accessed by any FN in the given FF. This feature makes our approach beneficial for
data owners in terms of data confidentiality.
Algorithm 3.9 is executed by the legitimate FNs remaining in the FF after executing
Algorithms 3.7 and 3.8. The TAS sends the new FNPKver+1 and a random large number m

45

Algorithm 3.4 Data Encryption (M , T, SP K, F F P K)
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:

A is set of atts represented by monotone access structure tree T
for each node x in T do
set a polynomial
if node x is root node in T then
set q(0)R = s // s is random value ∈ ZP∗
else
q(0)x = qparent(x) (index(x))
then choose dx = kx - 1 as polynomial degree to interpolate with qx
end if
end for
specify n as number of blocks in each file
specify Block’s size in certain file = M size/n
for each y ∈ Y do //Y is the set of leaf nodes in T
Cy = g qy (0)
0
Cy = H(att(y))qy(0)
end for
Compute: C = g βs
Call Algorithm 3.11-Part 1
for every Mi ∈ M do
Compute Civer = Mi .e(g, g)αs
Cver + = Civer
end for
0
Upload CipherText as {T, Cver , C, Cy , Cy , M D} to the cloud

Algorithm 3.5 Progress List creation/ Requesting File from CSP
1: FN submits a request to CSP
2: CSP verifies FN, by checking the legitimate FNs list
3: if FN is verified and cipher-text access structure policy is satisfied then
4: Check the progress list
5: if available blocks ∈ requested file blocks then
6:
Respond “list of F NIDs that have copy of this file” to let the requester get the file
from
7: else
8:
send the requested file/blocks to FN
9: end if
10: else
11: decline and notify other FNs in same federation that this FN is not legitimate
12: end if
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Algorithm 3.6 Data Decryption (CTver , F NP K−ver , x)
1: for each leaf node attribute “x” in access structure T do
2: Set i= att(x)
3: if i ∈ S then
4:
Recursively Compute
DecryptN ode(CTver , F NP K−S−ver , x) =
e(Di , Cx )
e(g r .H(F NI D)γver .H(i)ri , g q(0)y )
=
=
0
0
e(g ri .H(F NI D)γver , H(i)q(0)y )
e(Di , Cx )
e(g, g)rq(0)y , e(g, H(F NID ).H(i))γver ri q(0)y
=
e(g, H(F NID ).H(i))γver q(0)y ri
e(g, g)rq(0)y (3.1)
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:

11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:

if i ∈ S and x not leaf node then
for every child node z of x do
Fz = DecryptN ode(CTver , F NP K−S−ver , x)
end for
if Fz ! =⊥ then
//by lagrange and polynomial interpolation as in [24]
4 0 (0)
Q
0
Fz = z∈Sx Fz i,Sx wherei = index(z)andSz = index(z) : z ∈ Sx
= e(g, g)r.q(0)x = e(g, g)rs
if x =root then
A = DecryptN ode(CTv er, F NP K−S−ver , r) = e(g, g)rq(0)R = e(g, g)rs
elseDecryptN ode(CTver , F NP K−S−ver , x) =⊥
end if
end if
end if
end if
Decrypt Message by Computing:
αs
M.e(g,g)αs
Cver
i .e(g,g)
= e(gβs ,gM(α+r)/β
= e(g,g)(βsα+βsr)/β
Mi = e(C,D)/A
)/e(g,g)rs
/e(g,g)rs
=

19:
20:
21:
22:

Mi .e(g,g)αs
e(g,g)(sα+sr) /e(g,g)rs

αs

i .e(g,g)
= Me(g,g)
sα
for Mi =1 to Mi =n do //n is the number of blocks in given file
Plain-Text+ = Mi
end for
Call Algorithm 3.11 Part 2
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Algorithm 3.7 Ousting rogue FN (F F M Kver , F F P Kver , F F L)
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:

update F F M Kver →γ + 1∈Zp∗
update F F P Kver → F F P Kver+1 = F FID , g γ+1 , e(g, g)γ+1
remove ousted FN
for F Ni ∈ updated F F L do
propagate F F P Kver+1
end for=0

Algorithm 3.8 Re-Encryption (CTver , F F P Kver+1 )
1: Cloud service checks the progress list
2: Start re-encrypting blocks which have not been requested by any FN in same FF.
3: updated-file = Cver .e(F F P Kver+1 , C)
= Mi .e(g, g)αs .e(g γver+1 −γv er , g βs )
= Mi .e(g, g)αs+γver+1 s
4: CTver+1 = updated-file
to the updated list of fog nodes remaining in the FF via a secure channel. Upon receiving
this message, each FN in the FF updates its FNPK.
Algorithm 3.10 is executed by FNs. When a FN intends to download and decrypt
a file, it first needs to contact the CSP. When the CSP checks the progress list and finds
out the required file is already shared with another FN in the same FF, the CSP will reply
with a notification to contact the other FN which already has the file in the same FF. The
requester (FN) will contact the FN posses the file to provide the desired file.
Algorithm 3.11 is executed by authorized FNs prior to performing encryption process
and after performing decryption process to make sure that files/blocks not been maliciously
modified.
Algorithm 3.9 PrivateKeyUpdate
1: Remaining Fog Nodes in the federation receives F N P Kver+1
2: F NP R−S−ver+1 =
(D = g (α+r)/β ,
∀i ∈ S : Di = g r .H(F NID )m(γver+1 ) ,
0
Di = g ri .H(F NID )m(γver+1 )
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Algorithm 3.10 Fog Nodes Secure-Communication
1: FN receives a request,from other FN in same FF, to send file X or Blocks of file X
2: if FN requester is verified then // in the same FF
3: sender sends file/blocks to the requester
4: else
5: decline the connection
6: end if
7: requester performs decryption process by calling algorithm-6
Algorithm 3.11 Integrity Check
Part 1: Blocks Hash Calculation
1: for every Mi ∈ M do
2: Hash(Mi ) = MD
3: end for
Part 2: Blocks Hash Checking
4: When a FN retrieves Encrypted Data from CSP or from another FN;
5: if Hash(Mi == MD then
6: Return (”Integrity is Accurate”);
7: else
8: Return False;
9: end if
3.7

Performance Evaluation
This section presents the correctness and security analysis of avoiding the threats

to this approach as per discussed in section 1.5. Next, we discuss the Encryption-Based
Approach design and setup. Then, we conclude by analyzing the performance of the proposed
approach by performing different experiments with various factors.

3.7.1

Security Analysis
In this section, we first show the correctness of our approach. Then, we present the

security analysis in aspects of security against a rogue fog node, MITM attack, and a curious
cloud service provider.
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3.7.1.1

Correctness

The correctness of this approach is that the designed algorithms can effectively achieve
the desired objectives and security expectation. In this approach, the correctness is based
on authorized fog nodes ability to encrypt and decrypt the files through the algorithms we
design. We demonstrate that our proposed protocol is correct as follow. The fog node must
first divide the file to be encrypted into multiple blocks of predefined size. Then, FN encrypts
every block as Civer = Mi .e(g, g)αs . After that, it aggregates all the encrypted blocks to form
the cipher-text as Cver + = Civer in the data encryption algorithm.
The authorized FN can contact the CSP to download and decrypt a certain cipher-text.
Specifically, the FN executes the recursive function DecryptN ode(CTv er, F NP K−S−ver , r) on
the root R of the subtree T to find A = e(g, g)rs . The FN can decrypt the cipher-text by
decrypting each block Mi ∈ cipher-text. Then, FN aggregates decrypted blocks to obtain
the cipher-text, as follow:
Mi =

Cver
e(C,D)/A

=

Mi .e(g,g)αs
e(g βs ,g (α+r)/β )/e(g,g)rs

M.e(g,g)αs

=

e(g,g)(βsα+βsr)/β /e(g,g)rs

=

Mi .e(g,g)αs
e(g,g)(sα+sr) /e(g,g)rs

3.7.1.2

=

Mi .e(g,g)αs
e(g,g)sα

Security against Rogue Fog Nodes

A Fog-Node (FN) might go rogue for whatever reasons, such as being maliciously
compromised. In this case, the encrypted data stored either in the Cloud-Service-Provider
(CSP) or in other FNs are in dnager from the rogue nodes.In our approach, the encrypted files
in the cloud are protected against the ousted FNs by the following process: when updating
the FFL, the TAS updates the SP K and propagates it through a secure channel to the FNs
that are not yet members of the FF.In the meantime, it sends notifications to the CSP to reencrypt the files encrypted with a specific FF’s attributes, and it notifies the FNs remaining
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in the FF to update their secret keys. In this case, the ousted FN does not have the updated
SP K and, therefore, cannot update its private key for a future decryption process. This
feature makes our approach efficient in protecting end users’ data confidentiality.

3.7.1.3

Security against MITM Attack

In this approach, we assume that man-in-the-middle attack occurs when a third party
(attacker) tries to intercept encrypted data transmission among FNs and between the CSP
and FNs. The attacker can intercept block/blocks of the file to tamper with end-users’
encrypted data. This approach protects end-users’ data integrity when being in transit
among FNs and between the FNs and the CSP in two methods as follow.
First, the encryption process is preceding by a hash calculation for each block in
the files to be encrypted. Next, the encrypted file is uploaded to the CSP along with its
blocks hashes. In this context, whenever another FN in the same FF retrieves the encrypted
files, it calculates the hash of each block after the decryption process and then matches the
hashes against the received hashes. If they match, the integrity is preserved; otherwise the
corresponding blocks are damaged.
Second, the adversary ,that wants to tamper with the transmitted data, needs to have
a private key related to the current version of FFPK in order to decrypt the transmitted
blocks. Therefore, the adversary to generate a private key needs the following: 1) a correct
ID gained from the TAS upon joining the system. 2) a knowledge about the FF’s attributes
”S” and what is ri assigned to each attribute in S, see algorithm[]. 3) a current version of the
System-Public-Key (SPK) and the Fog-Federation-Public-Key (FFPK) which are propagated
by TAS to all authorized FNs in the FF.
Because the adversary cannot get any of the previous elements to calculate a legitimate private key without an insider collaboration which we assume it is not occur in this
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approach for now, and because of the hash function concept exploited in our approach, we
can conclude that our approach is resilient against MITM attack.

3.7.1.4

Security against a curious Cloud Service Provider

The CSP receives an encrypted data along with its hashes for storage. This approach
aims to prevent the CSP from having clue what the encrypted files’ contents. Therefore,
the only information the CSP has are: 1) the Fog-Federation-Public-Keys (FFPKs), 2) the
encrypted data with their hashes, 3) list of the Fog-Nodes in each FF. Someone might argue
that the CSP can generate a private keys related to the FFPK. However, since the CSP
has no clues about the System-Public-Key (SPK) and the System-Master-Key (SMK), and
the random ri ∈ ZP ∗ ,that TAS used to generate the FFPK, it cannot generate a private
keys from those elements. In this case, this approach successfully prevents the CSP from
decrypting the encrypted data.

3.7.2

The Encryption-Based Approach Design and Setup
We run the experiment of our approach on macOS Mojave 10.14 with an intel core i7

CPU 2.2 GHz and 16.00 GB RAM. We utilize the java pairing-based cryptography (JPBC)
library used in [89]. JPBC library provides a port of the pairing-based cryptography library
(PBC) [90] to perform the fundamental mathematical operations of pairing-based cryptosystems in java.
We simulated the CSP and TAS as servers and the FNs as local clients. We have
simulated the following Algorithms:1,2,3,4,5, and 6. Then, depending on that we collected
the experiment results. Our experiment tends to show that our approach is time efficient in
case of retrieving data from the same FF other than from the CSP. Any FN can access data
file encrypted by another FN in the same FF. For example, when specific FNx requests to
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access encrypted data in the CSP, the CSP checks the progress list if any FN has obtained
the requested file in the same FF, if yes the CSP will notify the requester to communicate
the FN that has the encrypted file to send it. Otherwise, the CSP sends the encrypted
file that has not been accessed by any FN in the same FF to the authenticated requester.
Our results show that the time it takes the FN to retrieve and decrypt a particular file
from other members in the same FF is less than obtaining it from the CSP. We let the FN
divide the file into blocks of 50MB size, and then perform other processes. However, fog
computing has been introduced to reduce the overhead burden on the cloud and to minimize
the time latency between the end users and the cloud. We have studied that and collect
results supporting such a claim.

3.7.3

Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we provided the experiments we carried on to show the feasibility and

efficiency of the Encryption-Based Approach.

3.7.3.1

Experiment 1: Time to Encrypt, to Hash and to Upload Files to the
CSP

Section 3.7.1 shows that this approach is robust in terms of algorithms correctness
and security against rogue Fog-Nodes (FNs). In this experiment, we measure the time it
takes a Fog-Node (FN) in a given Fog-Federation (FF) to hash, encrypt, and upload files
to the Cloud-Service-Provider (CSP). In this approach, the number of attributes is fixed to
two attributes that are location and service FNs provide. Prior to encryption process, we
let FNs to split files to be encrypted into blocks of 50MB each. We repeated the experiment
on our generated input files 30 times, then we took the average to analyze our approach.
As shown in Figure. 3.4, the splitting and hashing processes grow linearly for files with
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Figure 3.4: Hashing, Encryption, Uploading of Files with Various Sizes
one block. On the other hand, they take a slight exponential behaviour for files with more
than one block and sizes less than 160 MB. For files with sizes greater than 160 MB, they
grow in noticed exponential time. In addition, the files encryption process grow linearly in
case of files with one block, while they grow slightly exponentially for files of two blocks with
sizes less than or equal 160MB. It is obvious that the time increases sharply exponentially
for files of greater that 160 MB. The uploading process takes linear time for for files of one
block while it exponentially grows for files of more that one block. Figure. 3.4 also shows
that the hashing, encryption, and uploading operations behave exponentially for files with
more than a block. This behavior is attributed to our exploiting of the Attribute-BasedEncryption (ABE) algorithm as it is based on interpolation method. Also each block is
encrypted independently from other blocks.
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3.7.3.2

Experiment 2: Time to Retrieve and to Decrypt, and to Check the
Integrity of the Ciphertext from the CSP

In addition to that this approach is able to remove a specific FN of the FF, it is
efficient in reducing the communication overhead between the CSP and FF’s members as
the CSP will not send any file/blocks, to the FN, which already been shared with another
node in the same federation. CSP rather notifies the requestor to communicate the FN,
in same FF, which already has a copy of the file or blocks of the file. As justification, we
performed Experiments 2 and 3 to support this hypothesis.
In Experiment 2, we performed a study to measure the time it takes the encrypted
files/blocks to be downloaded from the CSP to the FN (requestor). Then, we studied the
decryption time takes a certain FN to decrypt the encrypted files/blocks. And finally we
studied the integrity check time of the decrypted files/blocks.
Fig. 3.5 shows that the running time it takes a FN to retrieve a ciphertext from the
CSP linearly grows for encrypted files with one block. For encrypted files with more that
one block, the retrieving time surges exponentially. The same behavior was inferred about
the decryption operation in which it grows linearly for files with one block while it grows
exponentially for files with more than one block.
This approach guarantees the integrity of the encrypted data to be protected against
any unauthorized modification. When a FN in a given FF retrieves an encrypted files/blocks
either from the CSP or from another FN in same FF, it is able to check the retrieved files
integrity. The integrity checking operation grows linearly for files with size of 80 MB or less,
while it increases exponentially for files greater that 80 MB, as shown in Fig. 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Retrieving Ciphertexts from the CSP, Decryption and Integrity Check
3.7.3.3

Experiment 3: Time to Retrieve and to Decrypt Files from same FF

One of the substantial feature this approach provides is FN capability to retrieve
encrypted files/blocks from another FNs in same FF in which they share same FF. For
example, suppose FN1 wants to retrieve Encrypted-File (EF1 ). Suppose another FN in same
FF as FN1 has an updated copy of EF1 , in this case FN1 will retrieve the required EF from
same FF rather than from the CSP. This means less communication overhead between the
FFs and CSP.
We performed Experiment-3 to show the efficiency of our proposed approach in reducing communication overhead between FFs and CSP. This experiment studied the time to
retrieve and decrypt encrypted files from another FN in same FF. Fig. 3.8 illustrates that the
time consumed by the FN to retrieve the ciphertext from another FN in the same FFgrows
exponentially. However, while retrieving the same ciphertext from the CSP, it performs
better as shown in Fig. 3.7
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Figure 3.6: Retrieving and Decryption of Ciphertexts from the same Fog Federation

Figure 3.7: Retrieving and Decryption of Ciphertexts from the same Fog Federation VS
from CSP
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Figure 3.8: Retrieving Various Percentages of Ciphertexts from the Fog Federation and the
Cloud Service Provider
3.7.3.4

Experiment 4: Time to Download Various Size of the Ciphertext from
the CSP and same FF

We performed Expriment-4 to show that the Fog-Federation concept is efficient in
terms of encrypted data retrieving. We have studied the running time of downloading different sizes of the ciphertext from the CSP and the same FF. Our work, for now, is focusing
on the side between fog nodes and the cloud.
Fig. 3.8 shows that the running time decreases linearly when the ciphertext size to be
retrieved from the same FF is increased, and this result supports our argument. However,
the best case for the FN is to retrieve the whole file from other FNs in same FF, while the
worst case is to retrieve the whole file from the CSP.
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3.8

Discussion
Based on the performed security analysis, we observed that this approach is correct

by proving our algorithms correctness followed by showing our approach robustness against
the rogue fog nodes, MITM attack, and curious cloud service providers. This means that this
approach supports the primary goals each system must have to be secure: Confidentiality,
Integrity, and Availability. This approach also provides fine-grained access control. For more
details read through section 3.7.1.
Because this work focuses on securing the channels between the FF and the CSP, we
assumed that communication channels between end devices and the FNs were fully secure.
Because FNs can divide the messages to be encrypted into multiple blocks and the CSP
maintains a progress list of each message, the CSP only sends the messages or blocks that
have not been accessed by any FN in the FF. Therefore, our approach minimized the communication overhead between the CSP and FFs. We assumed that the FNs in a specific FF
were not busy, so the communication among the FNs in same FFs was time efficient. In our
proposed approach, we assumed that the channel between FNs in the same FF was secure.
We also have not considered a malicious fog node detection as it is out of our scope for now.

3.9

Conclusion
End users’ data confidentiality could be violated while travelling through the FNs to

the CSP. Besides, the FNs would go rogue for what so ever reason. When the FN providing
services to end users is down, the data would not be available. In this chapter, we proposed
an efficient, secure, and a fine-grained data access control approach to create FFs of FNs
with same attributes. We utilized the ciphertext-policy attributed-based encryption (CPABE) algorithm. This approach is efficient in protecting the FF against rogue FNs by
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ousting them off the FF. So they cannot access the encrypted files in the CSP.Our approach
classified the FNs into different FFs depending on the location and services that each FN
provides; one FN can belong to multiple FFs. Moreover, our approach enabled the FN to
divide the messages to be encrypted into multiple blocks prior to performing encryption and
uploading operations. This helps to reduce communication overhead between the CSP and
the FFs. Based on our security analysis, the owners’ data confidentiality and availability is
maintained.
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4

Multi-Level Approach

In this chapter, we developed a multi-level approach to protect fog federations from
rogue fog nodes’ behaviours. Most sections that are shown in this chapter has been published
in [91] verbatim.

4.1

Introduction
The past few years have witnessed expeditious and successful developments in pro-

cessing and storage technologies. Cheaper, more powerful computing resources are now
ubiquitously available [2]. The most exceptional technology created in this technological
evolutionary era is, unarguably, cloud computing. Cloud Computing has gained a huge popularity providing on-demand services to individuals and organizations via the internet[3][4][5].
Cloud computing paradigm features unprecedented availability, dynamic scalability, and
economy that fulfill huge demands for computation and storage resources[7][8]. For these
reasons, individuals and organizations are substituting cloud storage for local storage. Customers have generated significant amounts of data to outsource to cloud data centers for
processing and storage without concern for hardware or software requirements or data size.
However, data owners faced issues when using cloud services even considering the outstanding benefits provided by those same services. First, the cloud computing paradigm suffers
from high end-to-end delay, communication overhead, and traffic congestion because data is
stored in geographically distinct locations, typically far from data owners [9][10]. The slowing in communication and end-to-end delays are exacerbated by the increase in the number
of end-user devices now connecting to the internet [11]. Second, individuals’ and organizations’ data are at risk in terms of security and privacy while in transit to and stored in, the
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cloud [12][13]. Last but not least, the issue of data access control has hindered individuals’
and organizations’ adoption of cloud services [14]. Maintaining data security and privacy in
cloud computing was a bothersome issue for data owners and a research hot topic for many
years. Accordingly researchers have adopted variant and advanced cryptographic techniques
and made great contributions toward resolving security and privacy issues. However, a new
technology resolving the time latency and communication overhead issues remains open to
research and implementation [9][15].
CISCO introduced a fog computing paradigm in 2012 [10] to reduce communication
overhead and time latency between cloud service provider and end-users and to provide new
services and applications to end-users [92][93]. Fog computing was deployed as multiple
clouds close to the ground so that end-users could utilize computing and storage services at
the edge of the network [15]. Fog computing subsumes multiples fog nodes which provide
end-users services [16]. Fog computing has introduced multiple features including real time
applications, low latency, location awareness, mobility, heterogeneity, and the capability of
processing high number of nodes [17][18].
Fog computing initiates data storage, computing capacity, and networking close to
data owners [17] and in doing so, fog computing inherits the security and privacy issues cloud
computing has faced [13][19]. Fog computing is a connector between the cloud and end-users’
devices [19]. End-users data travels through fog nodes to the cloud and vice versa. As data
travels, it becomes challenging to protect it from attack or breach. Data can be attacked in
different ways: 1) The fog node to which the data is outsourced could go rogue and breach
this sensitive data. 2) The fog node providing services to the end-user could be maliciously
compromised. 3) Confidential data could be intercepted and en-damaged malicious parties
in the media between fog nodes and the.
From here, there is a significant and necessary need for a approach to protect end-
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user data security (e.g. confidentiality, availability, and integrity), while it is stored in the
cloud or fog nodes or transiting between. There is also a significant need for a approach to
minimize the amount of data breached by rogue fog nodes. This chapter aims to design a
new approach conceived as a means of securing end-user data by ousting rogue fog nodes,
and minimizing the amount of data endangered of by those fog nodes being ousted. It is
intuitive that end-user data have multiple levels of confidentiality. Therefore, this approach
aspires to minimize the danger rogue fog nodes can cause to end-user data and to other fog
nodes.
In this approach, the advanced cryptographic primitive, Attribute-Based Encryption
(ABE), is utilized to accomplish our proposed goals. ABE enables one-to-many encryption.
It has two variants: ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [24], and keypolicy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [25]. In this chapter, we propose a CP-ABE
based approach to defend end-user data security and fog nodes against rogue fog nodes while
maintaining low time latency and low communication overhead between Fog Nodes (FNs)
and Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) as provided by the fog computing paradigm. The work
here focuses on the FNs and CSPs. This chapter major contributions are as follow:
1. This approach classifies fog nodes (FNs), depending on their attributes, into fog federations (FFs) to create trust among those FNs and for the exchange of encrypted
data.
2. This approach aims to minimize the impact of a breach by rogue/malicious FNs to
encrypted data . Therefore, this approach divides files to be encrypted into multiple
blocks depending on the level of data sensitivity. Then, FNs are distributed into
subgroups within each FF depending on the portion of the encrypted files those FNs
can access. There are shared attributes among all subgroups enhancing data sharing
among those FNs. This means if one FN goes rogue, the whole encrypted file will not
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Figure 4.1: Sub-groups Classification

be in danger of breach.
3. This approach prevents rogue FNs from accessing encrypted data in a CSP or in another
FN in the same Fog Federation Subgroup (FFSG). Legitimate FNs remaining in the
FFSG are allowed to access encrypted data with no latency.
4. This approach maintains the low communication overhead feature the fog computing
paradigm has proposed.

4.2

Classifying Fog Nodes into Subgroups
The concept of Multi-Level Approach is predicated on the classification of Fog-Nodes

(FNs) in each Fog-Federation (FF) into subgroups, e.g. Fog-Federation-Subgroups (FFSGs),
subject to the access level granted to each (FN) in a given (FF), Figure 4.1. The main goal of
this Approach is to minimize the danger of data breach or compromise by rogue/malicious
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Figure 4.2: Splitting Files to be Encrypted into Blocks.

FNs. This goal is achieved by distributing FNs into FFSGs based on the parts of the
encrypted files they can access. There are shared attributes among all subgroups. This
enhances data sharing among among FNs. Consider F N1 , F N2 and F N3 ; three FNs with
authorization to access only Less-Sensitive-Data (LSD), Figure 4.1. Should one of these FNs
go rogue, the Mid-Sensitive Data (MIDSD) and Most-Sensitive Data (MAXSD) are not in
danger of breach by these rogue nodes.

4.3

Splitting Files into Blocks
In the Multi-Level Approach, FNs only serve as intermediaries between the Cloud-

Service-Provider (CSP) and end-user devices. At the beginning, the Trusted-Fog-Node
(TFN) oversees division of the files identified for encryption into three blocks, each encrypted to the targeted FFSGs attributes. Each block is therefore accessible only to FNs
satisfying the FFSGs attributes to which it has been assigned, see Figure 4.2.
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4.4
4.4.1

Multi-Level Objectives
Confidentiality
The Multi-Level Approach provides data confidentiality on the FFSG level by utilizing

the Cipher-Text Attribute-Based Encryption approach []. The Multi-Level Approach splits
a file into multiple blocks and performs the encryption process for each block using the
FFSG’s attributes. More specifically, each block is accessible only to FNs that satisfy the
FFSG’s attributes. No block contains complete information regarding an encrypted file. This
Approach assures that FNs in a FF are divided into FFSGs whose members can access only
blocks of files encrypted to their FFSG’s attributes. FNs can not access encrypted data stored
in the Cloud-Service-Provider (CSP) unless their identities and the FFSG in which they
dwell, are proven legitimate to the CSP. This is accomplished by a digital signature concept [].
FNs must sign the request sent to the CSP with their Fog-Node-Fog-Federation-private-key
(FNFFPK). Then, the CSP verifies the provided signatures using the Fog-Federation-PublicKey (FFPK). The CSP verifies the FN’s (requestor) FFSG before returning an encrypted
block(s), returning to the FN only blocks encrypted to the FN’s FFSG’s attributes. The
means use of the FFSG concept boosts data confidentiality in this Approach as it reduces
the amount of data in danger of breach by rogue or malicious FNs by dividing the data.

4.4.2

Integrity
The Multi-Level Approach provides data integrity to stored files, preventing any

intentionally malicious modification to the encrypted data. A Trusted-Fog-Node (TFN) first
divides the file deposed for encryption into blocks, calculates the hash of each block, and
encrypts these blocks. The blocks and their hashes are then uploaded into the CSP for
storage. When an authorized FN in a FFSG retrieves a block(s) from the CSP, the CSP
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returns the requested block(s) and their hash(es) to the FN. The FN decrypts the block(s),
calculates the hash(es), and upon verifying that the hash(es) match, accesses the block.
Mismatched hash(es) will verify corruption of the encrypted block(s).

4.4.3

Availability
Fog computing plays a crucial role in the current computing paradigm. It works as

a middle connector between the cloud and IoT devices as it filters and pre-processes data
before it is sent to the cloud [?]. Fog computing provides availability and faster service to
end-user devices. Considered a great feature of fog computing, nodes are deployed close to
the ground eliminating the need for end-devices to wait for a centralized cloud to provide
services []. The Multi-Level Approach provides availability service to end-users devices via
the concept of the FF. End-users cannot benefit from the services a FN provides in their
region if that FN goes rogue or is down. The FF concept provides end-users with services
via any FN in the FF, bypassing a rogue or compromised FN.

4.4.4

Performance
The Multi-Level Approach guarantees data availability close to end-users devices by

enabling the FNs in each FFSG to retain the encrypted blocks retrieved from the CSP for a
period. The idea of FF boosts this approach performance as the FN (requestor) can retrieve
the needed block(s) from another FN in the same FF. To accomplish this, the CSP maintains
an Encrypted-Files-Tracking-Table. This allows the CSP to track and find files and the FNs
in current possession of them. When the CSP receives a retrieval request from a FN, it checks
the Encrypted-Files-Tracking-Table. If another FN in the same FF has an updated copy of
the requested block(s), the CSP directs the FN (requestor) to the FN in possession of the
block(s) for retrieval. This feature plays a huge role in reducing the communication overhead
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Figure 4.3: The Multi-Level Approach System Model.

between the CSP and FFs. After a period, the CSP considers the encrypted block(s) held
by FNs in a FF invalid as a precaution, further protecting files if an FN goes rogue or is
maliciously compromised.

4.5

Multi-Level Approach Overview
As Figure 4.3 demonstrates, Multi-Level Approach is comprised of the following enti-

ties: a Cloud Service Provider (CSP), Fog Nodes (FNs), a Trusted Authority Server (TAS),
and a Trusted Fog Node (TFN). FNs with the same attributes form a Fog Federation (FF).
Fog computing emerged as an extension allowing CSPs to address data delivery time
Table 4.1: Encrypted Files Tracking Table
FNID
FN1
FN2
FN3
...

FNatt
X
X and Y
X and Y and Z
...

Available EF
EF1 , EF6
EF5
EF7
...
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latency. However, fog computing inherited cloud security issues. Fog computing is prone to
malicious attacks, and accordingly, end-user data security is at risk.
To maintain individuals’ data security (e.g. confidentiality, integrity, and availability)
as it is in transit from the FNs to the CSP and vice versa, the advanced cryptographic
primitive, CP-ABE algorithm was exploited. The CP-ABE enforces fine grained data access
control securing communication between FNs and the CSP. This approach equips each FN
with a set of attributes and associates each encrypted file with an access policy which is
defined by these attributes. This means that no FN can access encrypted data unless it
satisfies the access policy associated with the data. In addition, to guarantee an authentic
communication among FNs in same FF, the digital signature concept was utilized.
This approach manages to minimize the amount of data compromised by a rogue
FN or attack. This is achieved by classifying the FNs into different FFs of FNs based on
a set of attributes that characterizes each FF. Consequently, FNs in each FF are classified
into subgroups described by a set of attributes from inner to outer levels. The FNs located
in the outermost subgroup can access data encrypted to FNs located in inner subgroups.
Contrarily, FNs located in the inner subgroups cannot access data encrypted to FNs in the
outer subgroups. Such a construction reduces the amount of data impacted if a FN in an
inner subgroup goes rogue or is attacked. The CSP maintains a progress list of the encrypted
files to demonstrate the possession of each FN in the FF, as shown in Table. 4.1. For the
sake of clarity, consider the following scenarios as an examples:
Suppose five fog nodes described as (FN1 , . . . , and FN8 ) are grouped by the TAS
into a FF according to their location and the services they provide. Then, the TAS classifies
those FNs into subgroups and characterizes them by one or multiple of these attributes:
X = Less-Sensitive Data (LSD), Y= Mid-Sensitive Data (MIDSD), and Z= Max-Sensitive
Data (MAXSD), see Figure4.1. In particular, the TAS characterizes each FN with single
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Figure 4.4: Access Structure for FF Attributes

or multiple attributes according to their subgroup in addition to the FF’s attributes they
belong to. FN1 , FN2 , and FN3 are characterized by attribute X which means they can only
access data encrypted with attribute X. FN4 , FN5 and FN6 are characterized by attributes
X and Y, then FN7 and FN8 are characterized by attributes X, Y, and Z. This means FNs
may be granted access to encrypted files marked with one or all of these attributes.
In the beginning, the Trusted Fog Node (TFN) splits File1 into blocks based on data
sensitivity, as Figure 4.2 shows, then performs hashing and encryption processes for each
block based on the subgroup’s attributes. After that, the TFN outsources the Encrypted
File (EF1 ) along with its hashes to the CSP for storage.
Suppose FN2 seeks retrieval of EF1,x , which is encrypted and can be accessed to FNs
in the Fog-Federation Subgroups (FFSG) with attributes X. FN2 , the requestor, sends a
retrieval request to the CSP for EF1,x . The CSP checks the encrypted file tracking table.
If another FN in the same FF has recently accessed the requested block, then the CSP will
direct the requestor (FN2 ) to the FN in possession of that block, which is FN1 or FN3 . This
feature reduces the communication overhead and time latency between the CSP and FNs. In
this example, FN2 is in the most inner FFSG which can access blocks of EF1,x characterized
by attribute X. As seen in the encrypted file tracking list, FN1 is in possession of the required
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block, so FN2 can retrieve this block along with its hash from FN1 . If no FN in the same
FF has an updated copy of the requested file/block and FN2 satisfies the FF’s and block’s
attributes, then the CSP returns the requested block and its hash to the requestor (FN2 ).
A FN could go rogue or be compromised by an attack. Therefore, to guarantee enduser data security and reduce the amount of data endangered by a rogue FN, precautions are
necessary. This approach acts as a barrier against a rogue, ousted FN and reduces the volume
of breach endangered data. To clarify that, suppose FN1 goes rogue or is compromised by an
attack. Our approach is designed to oust the rogue fog node (FN1 ) and render it incapable
of accessing any other encrypted file blocks characterized by attribute X in the CSP or other
FNs in same FF. FN1 does not have access to blocks characterized by Y and Z attributes.
This design feature means the data volume breached through a rogue or compromised FN is
minimized.
This approach is designed to instantaneously and simultaneously prevent ousted FNs
from accessing encrypted files, while maintaining data delivery to legitimate FNs remaining in the FF. The CSP and TAS Ousting Rogue FN and Re-encryption algorithms are
accomplished at the same time.
In addition, this approach helps in maintaining data integrity which protects encrypted data from interference when stored or in transit between a CSP and FNs or FNs
in the same FF . This feature is accomplished by verifying the hash of encrypted files every
time communication occurs among FNs or between the CSP and FF members.

4.6

Threat Model
In this proposed approach, three security models are demonstrated, reflecting the

following cases:
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4.6.1

Rogue fog nodes
Where an attacker compromises a fog node, or a fog node goes rogue. A compromised

or rogue FN may attempt access to file blocks which are encrypted to FNs placed in other
FFSGs. In addition, this kind of node may enact retrieval of encrypted blocks, without
proper access rights, from the CSP. Gaining access to the encrypted data of upper level
FFSG members can lead to violation of end-user data confidentiality and integrity. For
example, when a rogue or malicious FN becomes capable of accessing blocks encrypted to
other FNs in other FFSGs, end-user data confidentiality and data integrity is compromised.
End-user privacy would be exposed to unauthorized parties.

4.6.2

Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack
A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack means that an interceptor seizes the information

sent by the FNs, and tampers with it, and resends it to the CSP. This tampering creates the
potential for serious issues including the spread of false information and damage to data in
transition

4.6.3

Carious Cloud Service Provider
A curious CSP may have access to confidential data about individuals, including

names, addresses, salaries, and private images. A CSPs discovery of and access to any encrypted blocks has the potential to create negative impact on end-user privacy and jeopardize
data confidentiality and integrity.

4.7

Algorithms Design and Workflow of the Multi-Level Model Approach
This section describes the Multi-Level Approach based on the CP-ABE algorithm,

hashing and digital signature concepts. The access tree model presented in [26, 24] is reviewed
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Figure 4.5: Access Structure for FF with SG Concept

first as it is exploited as an access structure. This approach has two access structures: one
is for Fog Federations’ (FF) attributes Figure.4.4 and one for the Fog Federation Subgroup
(FFSG) attributes Figure.4.5. A description of the algorithms follows.
To satisfy the access tree conditions, we follow the same methods in [24, 25]. Let T
be a tree describing an access policy. In T , each leaf node characterizes an attribute, and
each non-leaf node expresses a threshold gate. For example, consider a node x with; numx
as number of children x has; and kx as a threshold value which 0 < kx <= numx . In case
kx = numx , the threshold gate is AND gate, and it is OR gate when kx = 1. The threshold
value kx =1 for each leaf node. For simplicity, another functions are described: att( x) is for
node x’s attribute only if x is leaf node, parent(x) is for node x’s parent in the tree, and
index(x) is for returning the number uniquely assigned to x. In order to satisfy the access
tree, let T is an access tree rooted at node R, and let Tx be a subtree of T rooted at node
x. In case set of attributes S satisfies the access tree Tx , Tx (S)=1. Tx (S) is recursively
computed as follows: 1) If x is not a leaf node, evaluate Tx (S) for x’s children; iff at least
one of x’s children kx returns 1, Tx (S) =1. 2) If x is a leaf node, Tx (S) =1 iff att(x) ∈ S.
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Fog Federations are created based on the access tree conditions demonstrated in
Figure.4.4. Then, to satisfy the features of this approach, a Trusted Fog Node (TFN) splits
each file into three blocks as described in the previous section. The Fog Nodes (FNs) in a
given Fog Federation Subgroup (FFSG) are capable of retrieving and decrypting designated
blocks if the access tree conditions in Figure.4.5 are satisfied. Next the algorithms required
for this approach are provided.
The Trusted Authority Server (TAS) executes Algorithm 1, which is based on [24].
The input to Algorithm 4.1 is a security parameter, and the outputs are a System Public
Key (SPK) and a System Master Key (SMK). The SPK is public to all FNs in the same
FF, the SMK is private to the TAS. The TAS constructs two universal sets of attributes.
First: Fog-Federation-Universal-Set-of-Attributes (FFU SAT ) is used to classify FNs into FFs.
FNs are classified into FFs based on location and the services they provide. Second: FogFederation Subgroups Universal-Set of Attributes(FFSGU SAT ) is a set of attributes used to
specify which blocks of encrypted files the FNs can access. Access is dependent upon the
FFSG’s attributes in which the FN is placed.
Algorithm 4.2 is also executed by the TAS. Its inputs are SPK, FFU SAT , and FFSGU SAT .
It is comprised of three parts. First: it creates a new Fog Federation List (FFL) of FNs
sharing the same FFatt . This list contains the FNID and FFID hashed to prevent id impersonation. It also contains the FFatt , and current version of Fog-Federation-Public-Key
F F P Katt−ver . Second: it divides the FNs residing in the same FF into subgroups (FFSG).
These subgroups are created according to the data access privilege(s) each FN is granted
upon joining the system. It creates a Fog-Federation-Subgroup-List (FFSGL) which contains:
a Fog-Federation-Subgroup-ID (FFSGID ), a current version of Fog-Federation-SubgroupPublic-Key (F F SGP Katt−ver ), Fog-Federation-Subgroup-Attributes (FFSGatt ), and the FNID
and FFSGID which are hashed to prevent FNs in each FFSG from impersonating other FNs.
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Third: when the TAS receives a FN join request , the TAS will confirm the legitimacy of the
FN by checking the predefined FFL. If the requestor (FN) attributes match one or multiple
FFatt and FFSGatt , then it will be added to the corresponding FFs and the correct FFSG.
Otherwise, the TAS will create a new FF with a new ID and attributes based on location and
provided services. Then, the TAS divides the FF into FFSGs, assigns the requestor (FN) to
the appropriate FFSG, and grants the requisite data access level to the FN requestor. Additionally, the FN is assigned an ID and added to the Fog-Federation-Subgroup-List (FFSGL).
Algorithms 4.3 and 4.4 will be triggered and the FFSGPKatt−ver will be securely sent to the
FN requestor.
The TAS also executes Algorithm 4.3. Its inputs are SPK, and SMK. The aim of
this algorithm is to generate a Fog-Federation-Public-Key (F F P Katt ) and a Fog Federation
Master Key (F F M Katt ) based on the FFatt . The (F F P Katt ) is public to all FNs in the
same FF while the (F F M Katt ) is known only to the TAS. Then, it generates a Fog-NodeSecret-Key (F F SKF F −att ) based on the attributes of the FF to which it belongs. The aim
of the (F N SKF F −att ) is to ease authentic communication among FNs in the same FF and
between the CSP and FNs. When a FN requests encrypted data from the CSP or another
FN in the same FF, it signs the request using its own (F N SKF F −att ). The receiver verifies
the request using the (F F P Katt ).
In addition, the TAS executes Algorithm 4.4. The purpose of this algorithm is to
generate a Fog-Federation-Subgroup-Master-Key (FFSGMK) and Fog FederationSubgroup-Public-Key (FFSGPK) for each attribute assigned to a FFSG. The FFSGMKs
are private to the TAS while the FFSGPKs are public to all FNs granted access privileges
to data encrypted with the FFSG attributes.
The TAS executes Algorithm 4.5. The function of this algorithm is to generate a
Fog Node Secret Key (FNSKF F SGatt ) based on the FFSG attributes each FN is accorded.
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Algorithm 4.1 Setup(λ)
1: Choose bilinear cyclic group G1 of prime order p with generator g1 ;
2: Randomly generates exponents α, β ∈ Gp ∗ ;
3: Random Oracle H: U SAT → {0, 1}∗ // to map each att in USAT into random element
∈ G1 ;
4: SMK and SPK as:
5:
SM K = {β, g1α };
6:
SP K = {G1 , g1 , g1β , e(g1 , g1 )α } ;
7: FFU SAT = FN location, Services
8: FFSGU SAT = X,Y,Z
9: SPK is public to all fog nodes, but SMK is private to TAS
This algorithm boosts the generation of a secret key for each FN premised on the encrypted
files/blocks it is privileged to access. It takes as inputs (FFSGMK, SPK, SMK, FNID ) and
outputs a distinct secret key (FNSKF F SGatt−ID ) for each FN in the FF.
This model is designed to reduce the communication overhead and time latency between CSPs and FNs. In a further effort to accomplish this, the CSP will maintain a list
called the Encrypted Files Tracking List. This allows CSPs to track FNs in current possession of encrypted files, as shown in Table.4.1. Algorithm 4.6 initiates creation of the
Encrypted Files Tracking List. A FN in a FF sends an encrypted file retrieval request signed
with its FNSKF Fatt−ID to the CSP. The CSP verifies the request using (FFPKatt−ver ). If
verified, the CSP will check the Encrypted Files Tracking Table. If a FN in the FF has a
copy of the requested data/blocks, the CSP will return the FNID currently in possession of
the file/block to the requestor. Otherwise, the CSP will return the file/block directly to the
privileged requestor FN. If the requestor FN does not pass the verification step, the CSP
will decline the request and report the FN as illegitimate to the TAS and other FNs in same
FF.
Algorithm 4.7 is executed by a Trusted Fog Node (TFN). The benefit of adding a
TFN to this design is in enabling classification of files to be encrypted into blocks based on
the sensitivity level of the data. In this approach, there are three levels of data sensitivity:
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Algorithm 4.2 FF and FFSG Creation and Adding new FN (SPK, FFU SAT , FFSGU SAT )
1:

2:

3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:

Part 1: FFL Creation
Create list of FF (FFL) to contain list of FNs in the system,as
F F L[F FID |F F P Kver |F Fatt |H(F NID F FID )]ver
Part 2: Creating FFSGL of FNs Based on Data Sensitivity Level they could
Access
Classify FNs in FFs into FFSGs:
F F SGL[F F SGID |F F SGP Kver |F F SGatt |H(F NID F F SGID )]ver
Part 3: Adding new FN to FFSG
if (F Natt == F Fatt &(F Natt ⊆ F F SGatt ) then
Assign the new FN an ID as, F NID == F NID + F F SGID
Add the new FN to the corresponding FFSG
Securely, send the F F SGP Kver to the new FN
else
Create new FF and assign it a unique F FID
Divide the FF into one or multiple FFSG
Assign the new FN an ID, F NID == F NID + F F SGID
Add new F NID to the FFSGL
Call Algorithms 3 and 4
Securely, send the F F SGP Katt−ver to the new F NID
end if

Algorithm 4.3 FF Keys Generation (SPK, SMK)
1: Randomly choose F F M Kver = γ 1 ∈Z∗p
2: Compute F F P Kver = F FID , g1γ1 , (g1 , g1 )γ1
0
3: F N SKF Fatt −F NID = (D = g (α+r)/β , ∀i ∈ S : Di = g r .H(F NID )γ1ver .H(i)ri .Di =
g ri .H(F NID )γ1 ver )
X = Less-Sensitive-Data (LSD), Y= Mid-Sensitive-Data (MIDSD), and Z= Max-SensitiveData (MAXSD). The FNs in each FF are classified into FFSG as explained in the previous
section. This algorithm has three parts.
The TFN triggers the classification of the files to be encrypted into blocks and then
uploading of them to the CSP. This design boosts the approach’s ability to minimize the
data volume endangered by rogue/compromised FNs. Not all FNs in the same FF can
access all blocks of an encrypted file. Authorized FNs in each FFSG are charged, through
this algorithm, with updating retrieved data from the CSP or another FN in the same FF.
In general, the TFN starts encrypting blocks of data using FFSGPKatt . This means no FN
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Algorithm 4.4 FFSG Keys Generation
1: for every i ∈ F F SGatt do
2: Randomly choose F F SGM Kver = γ2 ∈ Zp∗
3: end for
4: for every i ∈ F F SGatt do
5: Compute F F SGP Katt−ver = F F SGID , g1γ2 , e(g1 , g1 )γ2
6: end for
Algorithm 4.5 F N SK Generation (F F SGM Kver , (SP K, SM K)ver , S, F NID )
1: TAS revieves a request from a FN to join the system
2: if F NID is not verified then
3: Decline;
4: else
5: Randomly generate r ∈ Zp∗
6: for every atti ∈ S do
7:
randomly generate atti ∈ ZP∗
8: end for
9: for every att ∈ S do //S is blocks’ attributes FN can access
10:
F N SKF F SGatt−ID =
(D = g (α+r)/β , ∀i ∈ S : Di = g r .H(F NID )γ2ver .H(i)ri .H(F NID )γ2ver )
11: end for
12: end if
13: send F N SKF F SGatt−ID to the corresponding FN and update FFSGL
in the FF can access encrypted file blocks unless it satisfies the FFSG attributes.
Algorithm 4.8 is responsible for decrypting encrypted files/blocks in order to obtain
plain text, based on [24]. It is executed by authorized FNs in each FF. Its input is the
block(s) of the encrypted file the requestor FN is privileged to access, the current version of
F N SKF F SGatt−ID−ver , and the defined attributes in the access structure on the encrypted
blocks. The decryption algorithm outputs either the blocks to be retrieved or ⊥. Each
Fog Node Private Key is associated with the FNID , and FFSGatt . This feature makes it
impossible for a FN to retrieve encrypted data unless it satisfies the associated FFSGatt .
Algorithms 4.9 and 4.10 are simultaneously executed by the CSP and the TAS. The
TAS will oust a FN from the system for multiple reasons including report/detection as rogue
or malicious FN. Rogue FNs Detection is out of our scope for now. To protect end-user
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Algorithm 4.6 Encrypted Files/Blocks Tracking Table Creation/Requesting EF from the
CSP(F F P Katt−ver )
1: FN submits a request (intended EF/blocks) to the CSP signed with F N SKF Fatt−ID of
the intended block
2: CSP verifies FN, using F F P Katt−ver
3: if FN (requestor) not verified and cipher-text access structure policy is not satisfied then
4: Decline;
5: else
6: check the encrypted files tracking table
7: if available EF ∈ requested EF then
8:
return list of FNID have the required EF to let the requestor get it from
9: else
10:
Send the Blocks of the EF match the requestor (FNatt )
11: end if
12: end if
data security precautions against those rogue nodes are necessary. This approach efficiently
prevents rogue FNs from accessing blocks of the file previously accessible to it. Only the
FFSGPK of the FNs located in the FFSG where the rogue node originated would be updated.
This means that there is no need to update the FFSGPK for all FNs in the FF. This
mechanism of the approach signifies that FNs can access only data/blocks characterized by
its FFSG attributes.
To prevent ousted FNs from accessing encrypted files/blocks in the CSP or in other
FNs in same FF, ousting rogue FNs and re-encryption algorithms are simultaneously executed by the TAS and the CSP. This feature ensures that the approach is secure and robust
in its treatment of ousted FNs. The TAS starts by removing a rogue FN from the prestored
FN list. Then it updates the FFSGMKatt−ver and FFSGPKatt−ver to FFSGMKatt−ver+1 and
FFSGPKatt−ver+1 . The TAS then sends FFSGPKatt−ver+1 to the CSP for re-encryption, and
to the FNs with access privileges to the blocks characterized by the FFSG attributes to
update the private key(s).
Algorithm 4.11 is executed by the authorized FNs still in the FF after rogue FNs
have been ousted from the FF. After the TAS updates the FFPK and FFSGPK, it will
79

Algorithm 4.7 Files Splitting and Encryption (SPK,Blocki , T, F F SGP Katt )
Part 1: by FNs
1: A is set of attributes represented by monotone access structure tree T
2: for each node x in T do
3: set a polynomial
4: if node x is a root node in T then
5:
set q(0)R = s // s is random value ∈ ZP∗
6: else
7:
q(0)x = qparent(x) (index(x))
8:
then choose dx = kx - 1 as polynomial degree to interpolate with qx
9: end if
10: end for
Part 2:by TFN
11: divide the file to be encrypted into 3 blocks based on data sensitivity
12: for each blocki ∈ the file do
13: assign att as: blocki−att = X=(LSD)—Y=(MIDSD)—Z=(MAXSD)
14: end for
Part 3:by TFN and FNs
15: for every y ∈ Y do
16: Y is the set of leaf nodes in T
17: Cy = qqy (0)
0
18: Cy =H(att(y))qy (0)
19: end for
20: Compute C = g βs
21: for every blocki−att ∈ f ile to be encrypted do
22: Ci−ver = e(g, g)αγ2 s
23: Cver + = Ci−ver
24: end for
25: Call Algorithm 12 part 1
0
26: Upload CipherText(CT) to the CSP for storage as {T, Cver , C, Cy , Cy , M D} to the CSP
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Algorithm 4.8 Files/Blocks Decryption (CTver , F N SKF F SG−att−ver , x)
1: for each leaf node attribute “x” in access structure T do
2: Set i= att(x)
3: end for
4: if i ∈ S then
5: Recursively Compute
e(Di , Cx )
=
0
e(Di , Cx0 )
e(g r .H(F NID )γver .H(i)ri , g q(0)y
e(g, g)rq(0)y , e(g, H(F NID ).H(i))γver ri q(0)y
= e(g, g)rq(0)y
=
e(g ri .H(F NID )γver , H(i)q(0)y )
e(g, H(F NID ).H(i))γver q(0)y ri
(4.1)
DecryptN ode(CTver , F N SKF F SG−att−ID−ver , x) =

6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:

if i ∈ S and x not leaf node then
for every child node z of x do
Fz = DecryptN ode
(CTver , F N SKatt−ID−ver , x)
end for
if Fz ! =⊥ then
//by lagrange and polynomial interpolation as in [24]
4 0 (0)
Q
0
Fz = z∈Sx Fz i,Sx wherei = index(z)andSz = index(z) : z ∈ Sx
= e(g, g)r.q(0)x = e(g, g)rs
if x =root then
A = DecryptN ode (CTver , F N SKatt−S−ver , r) = e(g, g)rq(0)R = e(g, g)rs
else
DecryptN ode (CTver , F N SKatt−S−ver , x) =⊥
end if
end if
end if
end if
Decrypt Message by Computing:
blocki−att =

blocki .e(g, g)αγs
blocki .e(g, g)αγs
=
e(g βs , g (α+r)/β )/e(g, g)rs
e(g, g)(γαs+sr) /e(g, g)rs
blocki .e(g, g)αγs
=
= blocki (4.2)
e(g, g)sαγ /e(g, g)sγα

21: Call Algorithm 12 part 2
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Algorithm 4.9 Re-Encryption
1: CSP checks the encrypted files tracking table
2: Start re-encrypting blocks accessible to the ousted FN
3: updated-Ciphertext (CT)
= Cver .e(F F SGP Katt−ver+1 , C)
= Blocki−att .e(g, g)αγ2 s .e(g γ2 +1−γ2ver , g βs )
= Blocki−att .e(g, g)αs+γ2ver+1 s
4: CTver+1 = Updated-Ciphertext(CT)
Algorithm 4.10 Ousting rogue FN
1: Update F F SGM Kver →F F SGM Katt−ver+1 = γ2 + 1∈Zp∗
2: Update F F SGP Kver → F F SGP Katt−ver+1 = F F SGID , g1γ2 +1 , e(g1 , g1 )γ2 +1
3: Update F F M Kver →F F M Kver+1 = γ1 + 1∈Zp∗
4: Update F F P Kver → F F P Kver+1 = F FID , g1γ1 +1 , e(g1 , g1 )γ1 +1
5: Remove ousted FN
6: for F Ni ∈ updated F F L do
7: Securely broadcast F F SGP Katt−ver+1 , F F P Kver+1
8: end for
securely send them to the authorized FNs still in the FFL and to the CSP. FNs update
their own secret keys as they can access the encrypted data under their attributes. Our
approach is secure against the breach or compromise of end-user data confidentiality as the
ousted FN becomes incapable of accessing the encrypted data as soon as the CSP receives
the new FFPK and FFSGPK, and the FNs update their secret keys. This feature proves
the approach’s engagement in protecting end-user data security.
Algorithm 4.11 Fog-Node-Secret-Keys Update
1: Remaining Fog Nodes in the fog federation subgroup receive F F SGP Katt−ver+1 and
F F P Kver+1
2: F N SKF F(att−ID)+1 =
(D = g (α+r)/β ,
∀i ∈ S : Di = g r .H(F NID )m(γ1(ver+1) ) ,
0
Di = g ri .H(F NID )(γ1ver+1 ) )
3: F N SKF F SG(att−ID)+1 =
(D = g (α+r)/β ,
∀i ∈ S : Di = g r .H(F NID )m(γ2(ver+1) ) ,
0
Di = g ri .H(F NID )(γ2ver+1 ) )
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Algorithm 4.12 CT Integrity // between FNs and CSP, and among FNs in same FF
1: After performing algorithm 7
2: TNS performs:
Part 1:
3: for every Blocki ∈ P laintext do
4: Hash(Blocki )=MD
5: end for
Part 2:
6: When a FN retrieves encrypted file/blocks from the CSP or from another FN
7: if Hash(Blocki ==MD) then
8: Return (”Integrity is Accurate”);
9: else
10: Return False
11: end if
Algorithm 4.12 is designed to ensure the integrity of encrypted files/blocks as they
transit among and between FNs and the CSP and while stored in the CSP or FNs. In short,
this algorithm ensures data consistency over its lifecycle. At beginning the TFN hashes each
data to be encrypted with the F F SGP Katt−ver of the FNs that have the access rights to
those blocks. When a privileged FN retrieves a block, it verifies block integrity using its own
F N SKF F SGatt−ID−ver .

4.8

Performance Evaluation
In this section, the security aspects of the Multi-Level Approach and the ability of

this model to evade threats are analyzed, see Section.4.6. Next, the simulation setup will
be explained, followed by the performance analysis and discussion of the experiments. This
section concludes the performance analysis.

4.8.1

Correctness and Security Analysis
Here the correctness of the Multi-Level Approach is discussed, and a security analysis

is presented focusing on security issues involving rogue FNs, an MITM attack, and a curious

83

CSP.

4.8.1.1

Correctness

The correctness of this approach is based on the following: the algorithms and their
ability to achieve the intended objectives and security expectations; the authorized FNs
ability to encrypt and decrypt files through the algorithms.
The proposed protocol is demonstrated as correct through the following: the TrustedFogNode (TFN) must first divide the file to be encrypted into three blocks based on data
sensitivity level, see Figure 4.2; Then the TFN encrypts each block using the Fog-FederationSubgroup-Public-Key (FFSGPKatt−ver ) of the FFSG’s fog nodes it is encrypted to. This
means no FN can decrypt the encrypted blocks unless satisfying its FFSG’s attributes. The
TFN performs file splitting as follow:
for each blocki ∈ the file do
assign att as: blocki−att = X=(LSD)—Y=(MIDSD)—Z=(MAXSD)
end for
Then the TFN encrypts each block with the corresponding (F F SGP Katt−ver ), as follow:
for every blocki−att ∈ f ile to be encrypted do
Ci−ver = e(g, g)αγ2 s
Cver + = Ci−ver
end for
The TFN also calculates the hash of every block as follow:
for every Blocki ∈ P laintext do
Hash(Blocki )=MD
end for
The TFN then uploads the encrypted blocks and their hashes to the CSP for storage
84

as CipherText (CTver ), see Algorithms. 4.7 and 4.12.
An authorized FN can contact the CSP to download and decrypt a block(s) of a
certain cipher-text, Algorithm. 4.8. Specifically, the FN executes the recursive function
Decrypt − N ode(CTver , F N SKF F SG−att−ID−ver , x) on the root R of the sub-tree T to find
A = e(g, g)rq(0)y . This takes place if, and only if, the FN satisfies the FFSG’s attributes
for the encrypted block(s). The FN can decrypt the intended block(s) of ciphertext by
decrypting each block in cipher-text. Then, the FN aggregates decrypted blocks to obtain
the cipher-text, if the FN (requestor) can access more than one block, as follows:
Decrypt Message by Computing:
blocki−att =

blocki .e(g,g)αγs
βs
e(g ,g (α+r)/β )/e(g,g)rs

blocki .e(g,g)αγs
e(g,g)(γαs+sr) /e(g,g)rs

=

=

blocki .e(g,g)αγs
e(g,g)sαγ /e(g,g)sγα

= blocki

The authorized FN can guarantee the block(s) decryption accuracy by verifying the
integrity of the decrypted block(s) as shown in Algorithm. 4.12.

4.8.1.2

Security against Rogue Fog Nodes

Suppose a rogue FN is detected by the system. The Multi-Level Approach is designed
to oust rogue FNs and prevent them from accessing encrypted blocks to the FFSG where they
reside. A rogue FN with access to blocks of the file encrypted with the F F SGP Katt−ver , once
ousted, renders the encryption invalid. Therefore, the TAS will update F F SGM Katt−ver ,
and F F SGP Katt−ver to F F SGM Katt−ver+1 , and F F SGP Katt−ver+1 . The TAS will update
the (F F M Kver , F F P Kver ) to (F F M Kver+1 , F F P Kver+1 ). Next, the TAS will remove the
rogue FN from the FNL, then send the updated F F SGP Katt−ver+1 and F F P Kver+1 to the
FNs remaining in the FFL and to the CSP. The authorized FNs remaining in the FFL update their (F N SKF Fatt−ID ) and (F N SKF F SGatt−ID ) to new versions as: (F N SKF F( att−ID)+1 )
and (F N SKF F SG(att−ID)+1 ), as shown in Algorithms. 4.10 and 4.11 respectively. The CSP
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performs the re-encryption process as shown in Algorithm. 4.9. It also updates the hash of
each block in order to maintain data integrity. In this case, the ousted FNs cannot access
re-encrypted blocks

4.8.1.3

Security against MITM Attack

A Man-in-the-Middle Attack is considered a consequential security issue in Fog Computing. An MITM Attack is conducted by a malicious adversary situated between FNs and
the CSP. In our system design the adversary can intercept the traffic between FNs and the
CSP. In the Multi-Level Approach, the hash function algorithm is leveraged. The TFN divides the files deposed for encryption into blocks, then hashes each block, and uploads the
block and its hashes to the CSP. When an authorized FN retrieves a file from the CSP it
can detect any changed block by checking its hash. If a FN discovers a corrupted block, it
reports it to the TFN to regenerate the damaged block. In this scenario the Multi-Level
Approach is subtle in regard to detection of corrupted blocks by intermediary’s malicious
attack.

4.8.1.4

Security against a Curious Cloud Service Provider

One of the crucial goals of the Multi-Level Approach is the preservation of end-user
data security. The CSP in this approach is considered trusted. However, as a precaution
from further compromise against the CSP and to preserve end-user data security at storage,
the Multi-Level Approach merely stores encrypted data in the CSP without exposing the
decryption keys to the CSP. The TAS is responsible for key management in this Approach;
The TAS sends the decryption keys to the corresponding FNs in the FFSG they locate.
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4.8.2

Performance Analysis
This section presents the Multi-Level Approach experiment design followed by the

Multi-Level Approach setup.

4.8.2.1

Multi-Level Model Approach Experiment Design

This experiment aims to evaluate the performance and the applicability of the MultiLevel Approach. In the Multi-Level Model Approach experiment design, Fog Nodes (FNs)
are classified into different Fog-Federations (FFs) by attributes based on their locations
and the services they provide to end-users. Then, FNs in each FF are further divided into
Fog-Federation-Subgroups (FFSGs) according to the degree of data sensitivity an FN can
access. As a result of this division the amount of data that can be breached by a rogue or
compromised FN is reduced. This approach splits each file to be encrypted into three blocks.
Each block is encrypted with the corresponding FFSG’s attributes so that no FN from one
FFSG has access to blocks encrypted to another FFSG’s attributes. In this approach, every
FN stores the block/blocks of data retrieved from the Cloud-Service-Provider (CSP) for
a specified amount of time, allowing other FNs in the same FF and satisfying the FFSG
attributes, to retrieve the block/blocks from the FN currently in possession of them. This
feature boosts the approach’s ability to reduce communication and time latency between the
CSP and FF.
Studying and evaluating the system’s performance in experiments using various factors to confirm its feasibility and applicability. Java programming language and the following file sizes were used to test this approach: 10MB, 20MB, 40MB, 80MB, 160MB, 320MB,
640MB, and 1GB. The system’s experiments were conducted on macOS Mojave 10.14 with
an Intel Core i7 CPU 2.2 GHz and 16.00 GB RAM, utilizing the java pairing-based cryptography (JPBC) library used in [89]. The JPBC library provides a port of the Pairing-Based
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Cryptography Library (PBC) [90] to perform the fundamental mathematical operations of
pairing-based cryptosystems in Java.

4.8.2.2

The Multi-Level Approach Setup

The CSP, TAS, and TFN are simulated as servers and the FNs as local clients. The
algorithms in this approach are intentionally designed to show that dividing a FF’s members
into FFSGs and splitting the files to be encrypted into blocks will reduce the amount of data
in danger of breach by rogue or malicious FNs. Algorithms 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 12
are simulated.
Data is retrieved from FNs residing within the same FF rather than from the CSP
server. Any FN in the same FFSG can access a block(s) encrypted to that FFSG’s attributes. An otherwise encrypted block(s) is not accessible. For instance, suppose FNx ∈
FFArkansas,Health requires retrieval of File1 , which has three blocks, each encrypted to the
FFSG corresponding to the block’s level of data sensitivity. FNx sends a request, signed
with its FFPK, to the CSP for retrieval of the encrypted file (File1 ). The CSP checks the
signature to verify FNx legitimately belongs to the FFArkansas,Health . Then, the CSP verifies
the data sensitivity level accessible to FNx (the requestor) through its FFSG. The CSP further searches for another FN in the same FF with a current, updated, and accessible copy
of the block(s) requested. If found, the CSP directs FNx to the FN in current possession for
retrieval of the block(s) and their hashes. Otherwise, the CSP returns the requested data to
FNx , again, if and only if FNx satisfies the FFSG attributes for data accessibility.
It is also the goal here to compare the time latency between retrieval of encrypted
data from a CSP and retrieval from other FNs in same FF. Fog computing undoubtedly
reduces the time latency from the far cloud to end-user devices. However, if the FN serving
end-user devices in a specific region goes rogue or is down for any reason, the end-user will
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not benefit from fog computing services. From this insufficiency the Fog-Federation (FF) and
Fog-Federation Sub-Group (FFSG) concepts originated; the latter specifically designed to
reduce the impact of a rogue or compromised FN on end-user data security. Experimentation
shows that obtaining and decrypting a file from other FNs in the same FFSG requires less
time than obtaining it from the CSP. The Multi-Level Approach guarantees data integrity
by utilizing the hash concept. Fog computing was introduced to reduce the overhead burden
on the cloud and to minimize the time latency between end-users and the cloud. That has
been studied and results collected to support the claim.

4.8.3

Experimental Evaluation
The experiments are designed to use multi-threading to create multiple servers and

multiple FNs in each FF. Three servers were created as follows: Cloud Service Provider
(CSP), Trusted-Authority-Server (TAS), and a Trusted-Fog-Node (TFN). We also created
multiple Fog-Nodes (FNs) as clients that can communicate with the TAS and the CSP. Those
FNs are divided into Fog-Federation-Subgroups (FFSGs). During the encryption process,
the TFN splits the file into three blocks of equal size and then hashes and encrypts each
block with the FFSG’s attributes.
This approach aims to show the benefit of splitting files into blocks by data sensitivity
level and allowing FNs to retrieve only blocks where the required data is housed, thus
resulting in cost effective data retrieval. In addition, authorized FNs in each FFSG store
the retrieved data for a period of time and provide access to that data to other authorized
FNs in the same FFSG. The FN (requestor), sends a request to the CSP. The CSP scans the
Encrypted-Files-Tracking-Table (Table. 4.1) to check for an authorized FN in same FFSG
with an updated copy of the required block(s), if found, the CSP returns the address of
the FN currently in possession of the required block(s). This is achieved with the FFSG
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Figure 4.6: Dividing, Encrypting, Hashing of Files with Various Sizes
proposal. This also minimizes the communication overhead and time latency between the
CSP and FFs. Next, the performance of our proposed approach is presented through the
results of experimentation.

4.8.3.1

Experiment 1: Time Analysis for Files: Dividing, Hashing, Encrypting,
and Uploading to a Cloud-Service-Provider by a Trusted-Fog-Node

In this experiment the TFN computation time (execution cost) to divide, encrypt,
and upload block(s) to the CSP, is measured. The TFN divides the files disposed for encryption into blocks of the same size; meaning that block-size = file-size/3. The TFN begins
calculating the hash of each block, then it encrypts and uploads them to the CSP for storage.
The experiment is repeated on input data sets 30 times (See Section 1.8.2.1....... description
of data sets). The average is taken to analyze the approach.
The TFN rebounds linear time as blocks less than or equal to 27MB are divided,
hashed, and encrypted, show Fig. 4.6. The time grows exponentially when the block size is
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Figure 4.7: Retrieving One Block with Various Sizes from the CSP
greater than 50MB. On the other hand, the TFN uploading of blocks less than or equal to
27MB and their hashes to the CSP grows linearly, while it grows exponentially for blocks
greater than 50MB. Fig. 4.6 also indicates that uploading requires less time than dividing,
hashing and encrypting blocks less than or equal to 14MB, while they are almost equal for
blocks of 26.67MB. The uploading process time is greater than other processes for blocks of
50MB or more.

4.8.3.2

Experiment 2: Time Analysis for File Download, Decryption, and Integrity Check for One Block from the CSP by Authorized FN in FFSG

This experiment evaluates and analyzes the time required for an authorized FN in a
FFSG to download, decrypt, and check the integrity of one block of various sizes from the
CSP. This experiment assumes that no other FN in the same FFSG has an updated copy
of the required block. Suppose an authorized FN in a specific FFSG requests a block from
the CSP. The CSP authenticates the FN (requestor) and returns the requested block. The
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Figure 4.8: Retrieving Two Blocks with Various Sizes from the CSP

experiment is repeated 30 times on the input data sets. An average time to complete the
request is determined for use in the evaluation of this model. This experiment demonstrates
that the time it takes a FN in a FFSG to download one block from the CSP grows linearly as
block size increases from 3MB to 53.33MB, see Fig. 4.7. On the other hand, the time grows
exponentially for blocks exceeding 53.33MB. Fig. 4.7 also shows that the decryption time for
one block moves almost steadily for blocks between 3.33MB and 13.33M. It grows linearly
as block size increases from 13.33MB to 53.33MB, and increases exponentially for blocks
surpassing 53.33MB. The integrity check time for the decrypted block increases linearly
for blocks from 3.33MB to 26.67MB, while it exponentially increases for blocks larger than
27MB.
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4.8.4

Experiment 3: Time Analysis for File Downloads, Decryption, and Integrity Checks for Two-Three Blocks from the CSP by Authorized FN in
FFSG
This experiment measures and evaluates the time it takes an authorized FN in a

certain FFSG to retrieve, decrypt, and conduct an integrity check on multiple blocks from
the CSP. This experiment also assumes that no FN in the FFSG has an updated copy of
the required blocks. This means the FN (requestor) has no other option than retrieving the
required blocks from the CSP. This retrieval is applicable when a FN needs piece of data
that are stored in two or three blocks of an encrypted file. The experiment is repeated 30
times and time is averaged for use in time analysis.
It is observable through this experimentation that the download time for an authorized FN in a specific FFSG to retrieve two and three blocks of an encrypted file from the
CSP grows linearly for files less than or equal to 53.33MB per block, while it exponentially
surges for blocks greater than 100MB. Furthermore, the time required for a FN to decrypt
the retrieved blocks (two or three blocks) from the CSP linearly increases for blocks less than
or equal to 53.33MB, while exponentially increasing for blocks greater than 54MB. Verification of block integrity increases linearly for blocks of 53.33MB or less, while it exponentially
grows for blocks greater than 54MB, see Fig. 4.8 and Fig. 4.9. Experiments 2 and 3 support
our Multi-Level Approach. The experiments validate the efficiency of this approach wherein
FNs can only access blocks encrypted to the FFSG attributes they satisfy. This means that
a rogue or compromised FN in an FFSG will not breach the entirety of the encrypted file as
it would not have access. The Multi-Level Approach is also time efficient as it enables FNs
to retrieve block/s of the encrypted file rather than the whole.
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4.8.4.1

Experiment 4: Retrieving Block(s) from other FNs in the Same FFSG

In addition to the ability of the Multi-Level Approach to oust rogue FNs by rendering
them incapable of accessing encrypted data in the CSP or in other FNs in same FFSG, it
efficiently minimizes the communication overhead between the CSP and the FFs. This
capability is attributed to a feature that enables the CSP to check the Encrypted-FilesTracking-Table, (Table. ??, and search for another FN in same FFSG with an updated
copy of the requested block(s). If found; the CSP returns the address(es) of those FNs to
the FN (requestor) for local retrieval. This experiment demonstrates the time necessary
for a FN in a FFSG to retrieve one, two, or three blocks from the same FFSG. The time
is compared against that of retrieving the same blocks from the CSP. Fig. 7.1 illustrates
linear growth in FN download time of a variable number of blocks from the same FFSG for
blocks equal to or less than 13.33MB, while it exponentially increases for blocks equal to
or greater than 26.67MB. It becomes obvious that retrieval time increases as the number of
blocks requested increases. Another experiment compares the time required for downloading
a variable number of blocks of various sizes from the CSP and from the same FFSG. This
experiment demonstrates that retrieval time from the same FFSG outperforms retrieval of
the same blocks from the CSP, Fig. 4.11. As indicated, this study has been implemented
utilizing variable numbers of blocks of various sizes and the argument appears to hold true.

4.9

Discussion
The performance evaluation in Section 1.8, page .., illustrates this approach’s ability to

accomplish the security objectives: mainly fine-grained data access control, confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. Also, this approach focuses on minimizing the communication
overhead and time latency between the Cloud-Service-Provider (CSP) and Fog-FederationSubgroup (FFSG) members. This is accomplished by enabling the CSP to maintain the
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Figure 4.9: Retrieving Three Blocks with Various Sizes from the CSP

Figure 4.10: Retrieving Different Number of Blocks with Various Sizes from same FFSG
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Figure 4.11: Downloading Time from CSP VS from same FFSG
Encrypted-Files-Tracking-Table, Table. ??. This table helps the CSP to return only blocks
in not currently in the possession of another FN in the same FFSG. The proposed approach
secures the communication link between the CSP and FF, and among FNs in the FF, by
exploiting the hash function mechanism. Thus, the data receivers (FNs) can check the
received blocks for damage, meaning that it is resistant to MITM attack. Besides, the
proposed approach is secure against rogue FNs; this is accomplished by executing algorithms
9, 10, and 11. Consequently, the ousted FN is incapable of accessing encrypted blocks in
either the CSP or other FNs in the same FFSG. The approach assumes that FNs in FFs are
not busy; the requests are instantly processed. Rogue FN detection is not considered here
as it is outside the scope of this research for now.

4.10

Conclusion
End-user data security (e.g., confidentiality, integrity, availability) can be maliciously

violated either by rogue FNs or while in transit between the FNs and the CSP. The Multi96

Level Approach is proposed here as an efficient, secure, and fine-grained data access control,
to minimize the amount of data in danger of breach by rogue FNs, and from damage while
in transit. The Ciphertext-Policy-Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) algorithm and the
hash-function mechanism are utilized in the design of this approach. The algorithm design
and performance evaluation prove that the approach is efficient in minimizing the amount
of data in danger of malicious breach by rogue FNs. This is achieved by dividing files
to be encrypted into blocks and then encrypting each block to the corresponding FFSG’s
attributes based on the block level of data sensitivity. The approach classifies the FNs into
FFs based on the FF’s attributes; mainly by location and services provided by FNs. FNs
are further classified to sub-groups called FFSGs based on the access right granted to the
FN upon joining the FF. FFSGs are characterized by one or multiple of these attributes: X
= Less-Sensitive Data (LSD), Y = Mid-Sensitive Data (MIDSD), and Z = Most-Sensitive
Data (MAXSD). This means each FN can only access the blocks encrypted to the FFSG
attributes in which the FN resides. Each FN can belong to multiple FFSGs depending
on the access-rights granted to it by the Trusted-Authority-Server (TAS). The performance
evaluation expresses the efficiency and applicability of this approach.
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5

A Blockchain-Encryption-Based Approach

In this chapter, we developed a Blockchain-Encryption-Based approach to protect fog
federations from rogue fog nodes. Most sections that are shown in this chapter has been
published in [94] verbatim.

5.1

Introduction
Cloud computing is a thriving paradigm due to the enormous on-demand services

it provides to end users over the internet. Cloud computing has provided customers with
innovative features such as availability, scalability, and economy that help to satisfy the
substantial demand for storage and computation resources [6]. End users outsource their
data, to the core network on the cloud, for processing and storage. However, there are many
obstacles facing data owners. First, the response time between users and the cloud is high
because the data is stored in far from the data owners. Second, end-users’ data security
and privacy are susceptible to violation because of the semi-trusted third party controls the
cloud. The research community has studied the issues of data security and privacy in cloud
computing by adopting and applying advanced cryptographic techniques. However, it is still
demanding to invent a new technology to resolve the cloud latency issue [9][15].
From here, fog computing was introduced in 2012 [10] to reduce the time latency between the cloud and end users’ devices [9][15] and to provide new services and applications
to end users. Fog computing paradigm is as small clouds close to end-user’s devices, which
allows customers to utilize the computing and storage services at the edge of the network
[10]. More specifically, fog computing comprises of multiple fog nodes which provide services
to end users [16]. The fog computing paradigm has supported end devices with distinguish98

ing features such as mobility, location awareness, and low time latency [18]. Because fog
computing is deemed as an extension of the cloud computing paradigm; therefore, it inherits
some of the security and privacy obstacles in cloud computing[13]. In particular, a fog computing paradigm is susceptible to different threats, such as malicious attacks and technical
issues. In this context, the end users’ data traveling through fog computing nodes to the
cloud is vulnerable to different violations. Therefore, it is necessary to design a approach to
protect end-users’ data confidentiality, availability, and integrity by ousting the rogue (malicious) fog nodes. One reason for these vulnerabilities is that end users outsource sensitive
data to the nearby fog node for processing and then to the cloud for further processing and
storage. Because this fog node is seen as a connector between end users and the cloud, it is
challenging to protect other fog nodes and the cloud from malicious attacks. End users’ data
security would be difficult to defend if the fog node providing services in terms of storage
and computation is compromised or goes rogue. We have been motivated by those issues
to protect customers’ private data from being compromised. Also, a method to secure communication among fog nodes is required to exchange encrypted data for reducing the time
latency to retrieve it from the far cloud.
In general, threats in the context of fog computing takes two forms. 1) data modification: if an adversary gets hands-on end users’ private data, he/she might violate its
confidentiality and integrity. Therefore, introducing a security approach is necessary to prevent data confidentiality and integrity violation among fog nodes; and between fog nodes
and the cloud. 2) unauthorized access: when an adversary compromises a fog node, he/she
can get unauthorized access to the end users’ private data. Besides, data availability is in
danger of malicious violation in this way. Therefore, it is essential to introduce a security
approach to protect against rogue (malicious) fog nodes and to oust them off the network
while maintaining low time latency feature fog computing provides. Additionally, it is vital
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to enabling the fog nodes to carry on a distributed authorization process and to communicate
in a trust-less environment.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) is a cryptographic primitive that enables oneto-many encryption. It comprises two types: ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption
(CP-ABE) [22] and key policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [25]. CP-ABE was introduced by Bethencourt at el. [22] which is deemed as one of the most significant algorithms
to provide fine-grained data access control.
Blockchain has attracted the attention of researchers since it was introduced in late
2008 [95]. Blockchain is a shared distributed ledger, which is secured, immutable, and transparent, that helps in processing and tracking resources without depending on a centralized
trusted third party [29]. With this promising technology, peer-to-peer nodes can communicate, and exchange resources where the decision is carried on in a distributed manner by the
majority of the network’s nodes rather than a single centralized trusted third party.
This chapter proposes a approach to oust rogue (malicious) fog nodes and to minimize
the communication overhead between the cloud service provider (CSP) and fog nodes (FNs)
by integrating the CP-ABE algorithm and blockchain technology. Blockchain is adopted
as a medium to store on-chain tracking table to verify the identity of each fog node using
the smart contract before they could access the encrypted data on the CSP. The blockchain
immutability feature prevents fog nodes from maliciously changing the on-chain tracking
table, if such a change detected, the FN which issues the request is reported as a rogue fog
node.
The rest of this chapter is organized as: Section (II) presents the related work. Section
(III) focuses on the motivation of this chapter. Section (IV) explains the proposed approach,
and the approach description is broadly explained in section (V). Finally, the security analysis
and the conclusion consecutively are in sections (VI) and (VII).
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5.2

Idea Behind using Blockchain as Fog Federation
In this chapter, we exploited the Ethereum blockchain smart contract as intermediary

among Fog-Nodes (FNs) that belong to the same Fog-Federation (FF). We constructed each
FF as a private blockchain in which the FF’s members can perform an authorization process
in distributed manner using the Smart Contract (SC) concept. In addition, this approach
deploys the On-chain Tracking Table (see Table 5.1) which has to be protected from being
tampered with by malicious/rogue FNs. This is attributed to the tamper proof nature of
blockchain technology. Therefore, that was the main reason for exploiting the concept of
blockchain technology. Also, this table is used as an access control table smart contract uses
to verify the FN (requestor) identity in order to return the stored encrypted file credentials
to the FN to be able to retrieve the file from the IPFS.
Our approach allows the Fog-Node that originates the encrypted data to encrypt it
only to the other FNs in same FF. This approach precisely detects and blocks malicious/rogue
FNs from retrieving encrypted data either form the Shared-Storage (SS) or from other FF’s
member (FN).
This approach must efficiently achieve the approach security objectives in the sense
that the consumption gas takes smart contract to perform approach’s functions should be
affordable to FNs. One of the most important feature of this approach is to detect and oust
the rogue fog nodes which would positively improve the security of encrypted data stored in
the Shared-Storage.
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5.3
5.3.1

A Blockchain-Encryption-Based Approach Objectives
Confidentiality
The Blockchain-Encryption-Based Approach provides data confidentiality to the data

stored in the Shared-Storage (SS). This approach integrates the Ciphertext-Attribute-BasedEncryption (CP-ABE) algorithm with the Ethereum blockchain smart contract to reach the
maximum level of protecting the confidential data. This approach assures data confidentiality
by enabling the Fog-Node (FN) to encrypt data to the Fog-Federation (FF) it belongs to, and
in the meantime, no FN can access this encrypted data unless being proofed by the smart
contract. The FN (data encryptor) generates a random secret key to encrypt the file. Then,
it uploads the Encrypted-File (EF) to the SS for storage. The SS returns the index-hash
of the file to the FN (file owner). Then, the FN encrypts the SK using the Fog-FederationPublic-Key (FFPK), and after that it uploads the encrypted SK and the index-hash (e.g.
File-ID) to the smart contract of the FF. This approach would not allow the FNs to download
the Encrypted-File (EF) from the SS (e.g. IPFS in this approach) unless being verified by
the smart contract to get the EF’s hash-index to be used to download the EF. In addition,
when the SC verifies the FN (requestor) as legitimate, it would return the EF’s SK that
would be used by the FN for decryption process upon downloading the EF from the IPFS.
This means use of Ethereum Blockcahin Smart contract concept boosts data confidentiality
in this approach as it protects the On-chain Tracking-Table from being tampred and acting
as a protection wall against rogue FNs from access encrypted data stored in the IPFS.

5.3.2

Integrity
In addition to providing the confidentiality to the stored data, this approach maintains

the integrity of the data stored in the SS. Fog-Nodes (FNs) calculate the hash of the files
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prior to the encryption process, then they post the encrypted files’ hashes to the Smart
Contract (SC) along with the index-hashes returned by the SS (e.g. IPFS storage). When
an authorized FN retrieves an Encrypted-File (EF) from the SS using the hash-index, it
is able to check the EF integrity post decryption process. The mismatched hash(es) will
verify the damaged of the EF, and accordingly the FN will post that to the SC to make it
noticeable to other FNs in the same FF that this EF has been somehow modified. The SC
would mark this EF as damaged.

5.3.3

Availability
Fog computing emerged with important features to be added to the current computing

paradigm. Fog computing is considered as middle level between cloud computing and endusers’ devices such as IoT and mobile devices because it filters and pre-process data before
being outsourced to the cloud[]. It is one of the Fog-Federation (FF) concept motivation to
keep data available to end-users even though the Fog-Node providing services to end-devices
in a specific location is down or ousted for what so ever reason. The end-users still could
communicate with other FNs in same FF to get the same services provided with the ousted
FN. It is undoubted that the Fog-Federation concept will greatly improve the data and nodes
management in the fog computing paradigm.

5.4

Proposed Approach and Assumptions

5.4.1

Overview of the Blockchain-Encrypted-Based Approach
In this section, we describe the architecture of the proposed Blockchain-Encrypted-

Based Approach based on smart contracts. By referring to Fig. 5.1, we first describe the
entities comprise our approach. This approach comprises of the following entities:
• Shared-Storage (SS): In this approach, we used the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS)
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as a Shared-Storage (SS) to store the Encrypted-Files (EFs) uploaded by the FNs. The
IPFS returns the index-hash upon receiving the uploaded files.
• Fog-Nodes (FNs): FNs are the entities that provides services to end-users in the fog
computing paradigm. FNs with same attributes form a Fog Federation (FF) which is
considered as a private blockchain. This means that if the Fog Node (FN) providing
services to end users goes down/rogue, the end user can still obtains the same services
from other FNs in the same FF. FNs in same FF can verify each other by invoking the
smart contact, i.e. smart contract can check whether FN requesting an access to an
encrypted file posses the FF’s legitimate attributes or not.
• Trusted-Authority-Server (TAS): This sever is assumed to be fully trusted in this approach. We used it to set up the system and to generate the required keys to operate
the system. It is responsible of posting FFPK and FF’s attributes to the smart contract. It is a pre-verified authorized node on the Ethereum blockchain. It assigns
attributes to FFs, and adding new FNs to FF.
• Smart Contract: Ethereum blockchain smart contract was exploited to enforce trust
among FNs in smae FF. Also it is used to track the On-Chain-Tracking-Table to prevent
any unauthorized access to the encrypted data stored in the SS. It functions as miners
to validate the requests generated by FN in same FF. Through this chapter, we use
fog federation and private blockchain interchangeably.
Data delivery from cloud storage (e.g. SS in this approach) to end-users’ devices
is hindered by time latency and communication overhead. Fog computing has emerged to
address these issues. However, FNs are exposed to malicious attacks; consequently, the end
users’ data security may be violated. To maintain confidentiality, integrity and availability
for end-users’ data travelling through FNs to the SS, we exploit and integrate blockchain
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Figure 5.1: The system model.
with the CP-ABE algorithm, an advanced cryptographic primitive that enforces fine-grained
data access control to secure communication between FNs and the CSP. Using blockchain,
FNs can perform the authorization process in a distributed manner. To solve the problem
of high communication overhead, we deploy an access control policies table (on-chain files
tracking table) on Ethereum smart contract ,as shown in Table 5.1, which must be protected
from tampering conducted by malicious (rogue) FNs. Blockchain plays a vital role here, as
it is tamper-proof by nature.
In this approach, after a TAS validates a FN for possessing a set attributes, the TAS
then will issue an ID for the FN and assign it to the corresponding FF based on its attributes,
namely location and services. This validation is carried out in the context of smart contract.
Each FN in the same FF maintains an on-chain files tracking table to provide finegrained access control by using a smart contract. This allows other FNs in the same FF to
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access the encrypted data on the IPFS when their attributes satisfy the stored predicates in
the on-chain files’ tracking table.
When a FN sends a query to the SC to access a certain EF, the SC checks whether
any FN in the FF has the required file stored in its off-chain database (DB). If so, it refers the
requestor to get the file from the FN currently in possession of the file instead of sending the
request to the IPFS. When the FN (data requester) requests an EF from another FN in the
same FF, the receiver would verify the requestor legitimacy using the smart contract. This
feature is a benefit of this approach, as it minimizes the communication overhead between
the Shared Storage (SS) and the FF. When the FN obtains the index-hash of the EF stored
in the IPFS, it could retrieve the desired encrypted file.
In fog computing, FNs collect data from end devices. They process those data and
upload the results to the cloud for further processing and storage. We equip every FN
with two databases (DBs), an off-chain and an on-chain DB. The off-chain DB stores the
encrypted data most frequently accessed by end-users, which reduces the communication
overhead between the SS and the FFs. FN can retrieve data encrypted by FNs in the
same FF. This feature helps maintaining data availability when ousting an FN from the
FF near to end-users’ devices. Also the end-users would still obtain same services provided
by the FN close to them, if this FN got ousted, from another FN in the FF. The on-chain
database is considered as digital ledger and stored on the blockchain. It stores an on-chain
file tracking table as shown in Table-5.1 to verify FF’s members identifications in context of
smart contract. For the sake of clarity, we will consider the following example:
Suppose FN1 encrypts file F1 using a random secret key (SK). Next, it uploads the
encrypted file (EF1 ) to the IPFS and obtain a index-hash from IPFS. After that the FN1
query the smart contract to obtain the FFPK to use it in encrypting the SK. Then, FN1 post
the index-hash, encrypted SK, and the file hash to the Ethereum blockchain smart contract.
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Now, suppose FN2 which is in same FF as FN1 seeks to retrieve an EF1 , there are three
scenarios we have studied in this chapter:
• First scenario: FN2 intends to retrieve the EF1 in which no other FN in same FF has
an updated copy of the file in its off-chain DB. In this case, FN1 will query the smart
contract in order to obtain the index-hash, file hash and the encrypted SK. If FN1 is
successfully verified by the smart contact, it will receive the index-hash, file hash and
the encrypted SK of the desired EF . Next, FN2 decrypts the SK using its own FNSK.
Next, it retrieves the encrypted file from the shared storage using the index-hash.
• Second Scenario: FN2 seeks retrieving EF1 in which FN3 in same FF has updated copy
of the file. In this case, FN2 queries the SC to retrieve EF1 . SC returns the required
file credentials to FN2 plus FN3 ’s address. Further, FN2 will communicate FN3 to
get EF1 . FN3 will validate FN2 identity by invoking the smart contract. If the smart
contract returns that FN2 is a member of the same FF, FN3 will return the file to FN2 .
This feature gives our approach a credit in minimizing the communication overhead
between the SS and the FFs. This is possible with the fog federation idea. For more
details, read the approach’s description.
• Third scenario: FN2 is not verified by the smart contract, so it will not pass the
authorization process to get enough information to retrieve the encrypted data from
the SS. Accordingly, the FN2 (data requestor) will be reported as a rogue FN and
deleted from the FF.
An FN leaves the system for whatsoever reason, or it could go rogue after being compromised by a malicious attack. To ensure users’ data security, namely data confidentiality,
data integrity and availability, there has been a demand to take precautions against rogue
FNs. This approach efficiently acts as a protection layer against rogue FNs to prevent them
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from accessing the encrypted data stored on the SS. On-chain file tracking table is stored on
the Ethereum blockchain. Any FN query the blockchain with false information will be
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Table 5.1: On-Chain Tracking Table
IPFS Index
0x64EC...
0x7B502...
07x0B62...

FNID
FN1
FN2
...
FNn

EFID
EF1
EF3
...
EF7

FNsign−att
6*R!@MN
5*R*!WE
...
9TR!!NQ

FFPK
fNJk3u
KLJk3J@
...
@3EFJJL@

Attributes Set
Movies and CL
Health and AR
...
Education and AR

Encrypted(SK)
!!@3DSx
@@!!NB4
...
ms!!uB*

File Hash
*EFC!...
MNC!...
...
!67jK*...

off-chain DB
EF3
0
...
0
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detected based on the data pre-stored on the tracking table. We utilize the blockchain
in this approach to track the FNs in each FF and prevent unauthorized and ousted FNs from
accessing the data stored in the SS.
If an FN issues an update and it is not passed by most of the SC, the issuer would
be considered as a rogue FN and then excluded from the FF. When a rogue FN is detected
in the FF, it is decoupled from the FF. Accordingly, this feature enhances the approach’s
ability to protect against rogue FNs.

5.4.2

Threat Model

5.4.2.1

Rogue Fog Nodes

In this approach, we define rogue fog node as: a fog-node that retrieves encrypted
data stored in the Shared-Storage (SS) for malicious intention. It also could , maliciously
modifies the encrypted data. These incidents would violate the security of the end-users’
data stored in the Shared-Storage (SS). For instance, when a rogue FN becomes able to
download encrypted data from the SS or from other FF’s members, the data confidentiality
and data integrity of enc-users’ secret data would be compromised.

5.4.2.2

Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack

In our approach, the MIMT attack is defined as a third party intercepts the encrypted
data travelling between the FNs and the SS, or among the FNs in same FF to maliciously
violate credential data. If this malicious third party manages to modify the travelled data,
FNs would not be able to detect this modification unless counting on a robust method to
prevent and detect that. In addition, if MITM attacker manages to intercept the encrypted
data, that would cause the end-users’ data confidentiality to be violated.
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5.4.2.3

Curious Cloud Storage Service Provider

In any developed system meant to be secure, it is not a smart way to consider the
third party providing the storage service fully trusted. End-users care about their outsourced
confidential data to the fog nodes to be protected while being stored in the Shared-Storage
(SS). If the SS service provider discovers the uploaded encrypted-data, that would violate
the data confidentiality.

5.5

Design of the A Blockchain-Encryption-Based Approach Algorithms
In this section, we present the description of our approach based on the integration of

the CP-ABE algorithm and Ethereum blockchain smart contract. We exploited the access
tree model presented in [22] as an access structure A, as shown in Fig-5.2. To satisfy
the access tree conditions, we follow the same methods in [22][20]. For more information
about the access tree model, read through [22][20]. Next we provide algorithms and smart
contracts needed for our model. Algorithms 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 are implemented on external
environment from the Ethereum blockchain. The rest of the algorithms in this approach are
smart contracts we implemented in solidity.
Algorithm 5.1 is based on [22]. It is executed by TAS to start the system. It receives

Figure 5.2: Example of an Access Structure.

111

a security parameter as an input, then it outputs a System Master Key SM K and a System
Public Key SP K. These keys are used to generate keys for FFs and for FNs. It builds
a universal set of attributes (USAT), which FF classification is based on in our approach;
USAT = FN’s location, FN’s services.

Algorithm 5.2 is executed by an FN that aims to

join the system to provide a service for end-users. It contacts the TAS, then the TAS checks
the pre-stored Fog-Federation-List (FFL). The FFL is a list of FFs along with FNs in them.
The TAN accordingly assigns the FN to the corresponding FF if its attributes are verified.
If the FN is verified but no FFatt matches its attributes, the TAS creates a new FF and adds
the new FN to it. After that, the TAS invokes (adding FN to the FF smart contract) to
add the new FN’s credentials to the smart contract. However, if the FN is not verified, the
connection will be refused. The details of how to verify and authenticate the FN’s attributes
are out of our scope for now.
Algorithm 5.3 is also executed by the TAS. It generates a Fog Federation-Public-Key
(FFPK) and a Fog-Federation-Master-Key (FFMK). The FFPK is public to all FNs in the
FF, whereas the FFMK is private to the TAS. It also generates a distinct Fog-Node-SecretKey (FNSK) for each FN in the FF. Then, the TAS securely shares the FFPK and FNSK
with the new FN. TAS posts the FFPK to the smart contract and map the FFPK to FF’s
attributes. This would be accomplished by invoking the Fog-Federation-Creation Smart
Contract.
Algorithm 5.1 Setup(λ)
1: Choose bilinear cyclic group G1 of prime order p with generator g1 ;
2: Randomly generates exponents α, β ∈ G∗p ;
3: Random Oracle H: U SAT → {0,1}∗ // to map each att in USAT into random element
∈ G1 ;
4: compute SM K and SP K as:
5:
SM K = {β, g1α }
6:
SP K = {G1 , g1 , g1β , e(g1 , g1 )α } ;
7: The SP K is public to all FNs, but SM K is private for TAS
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Algorithm 5.4 is executed by authorized FNs in a given FF. This algorithm was
executed separately from the Ethereum smart contract as the current Ethereum platform
does not support ABE algorithms. The FN intending to encrypt a file generates a Secret-Key
(SK) and uses it to encrypt data. Next, FN encrypts the SK using the FFPK to enable every
FN in the same FF to decrypt the encrypted SK when needing to retrieve encrypted file from
the SS. Finally, the FN (data owner) upload the Encrypted-File’s (EF) to the Shared-Storage
(SS) which we use here the IPFS. Then the data owner upload the file hash, encrypted file
index-hash returned by the IPFS, and the encrypted SK to the smart contract by invoking
adding-File and Encrypted Secret-Key(SK) smart contract.
Algorithm 5.5 This procedure is executed by the Trusted-Authority-Server (TAS) to
deploy the smart contract to the Ethereum blockchain. The deployment process returns the
contract address in which the Fog-Nodes in Fog-Federations contact to be served. The TAS
sends the contract-address to every new FN upon joining the Fog-Federations groups. The
basic function of this smart contract is to keep tracking which FNs have which files in the
off-chain DB. This means less communication overhead between the Shared-Storage (SS)
and the FFs. No FN can retrieve the EF or perform any operation unless it gets authorized
by the smart contract. This is attributed to the blockchain tamper-proof feature. When
Algorithm 5.2 Join (FNatt )
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

New FN contacts TAS to join the system
TAN verifies the FN (requestor)
if not verified then
Declined
else
Check the FFL
if FFatt == new-FNatt then
Assign new-FNatt to the corresponding FFID , and assign ID to the new FN
TAN posts the FNID , and attributes by invoking adding FN to the FF Smart Contract
10: end if
11: end if
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Algorithm 5.3 Generating F N SK (SP K, SM K, S, F NID )
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:

TAS gets request from new FN to join the system
Choose bilinear cyclic group G1 of prime order p with generator g1 ;
Randomly generates exponents α1 , β1 ∈ G∗p ;
Random Oracle H: U SAT → {0,1}∗ // to map each att in USAT into random element
∈ G1 ;
compute F F P K and F F M K as:
F F P K = {β1 , g1α1 }
F F M K = {G1 , g1 , g1β1 , e(g1 , g1 )α1 }
post the FFPK to the smart contract by invoking addFogFederationMember() algorithm
in smart contract
generate random r ∈ Zp∗
for every atti ∈ S do
generate random ri ∈ ZP∗
end for
for each new FNi ∈ F F do
compute F N SK as follows
F N SK
=
(D
=
g (α1 +r)/β1 , ∀i
∈
U SA
:
Di
=
0
r
α1ver
ri
ri
g .H(F NID )
.H(i) , Di = g .H(F NID )α1ver )
send F N SK to FNi
end for

an FN intends to retrieve an encrypted file from the Shared-Storage (SS) or from another
FN in same FF, FNs could authenticate the FN (requestor) using the smart contract. This
approach prevents FNs in the FF from falsifying information about files’ tracking table or
accessing the EF in the CSP. This feature strengthen our approach robustness.
Algorithm 5.6 is a smart contract created by the Trusted-Authority-Server (TAS) and
deployed on Ethereum. TAS uses this part of the smart contract to issue Fog-Federations
(FFs) and map these FFs to FFPKs and FFattributes . It takes as inputs the Fog-FederationPublic-Key (FFPK), FFattributes (e.g. Location and services), members (e.g. FNs to be added
to the FF).
Algorithm 5.7 is a smart contract to add FNs to the FF and deployed on Ethereum.
It is invoked upon new FN joining the FF group. This smart contract maps the new FN
to the FF to the FFPK, and FF’s attributes. This smart contract also map the FN to the

114

Algorithm 5.4 Data Encryption (M , T, SP K, F F P K)
1: SK = gen.DEC-Key
2: Encrypted-File (EF) = Encrypt (M, SK) //M is the message to encrypt
3: A is set of atts represented by monotone access structure tree T
4: for each node x in T do
5: set a polynomial
6: if node x is root node in T then
7:
set q(0)R = s // s is random value ∈ ZP∗
8: else
9:
q(0)x = qparent(x) (index(x))
10:
then choose dx = kx - 1 as polynomial degree to interpolate with qx
11: end if
12: end for
13: for each y ∈ Y do //Y is the set of leaf nodes in T
14: Cy = g qy (0)
0
15: Cy = H(att(y))qy(0)
16: end for
17: Compute: C = g βs
18: for each SKi ∈ SK do
19: Compute Cveri = SKi .e(g, g)αs
20: end for
21: Upload [EF] to the Shared Storage (IPFS)
22: post the encrypted-File-Hash, index-hash and the encrypted SK to smart contract by
invoking addFile() function in the smart contract
Algorithm 5.5 Smart Contract Deployment
1: TAS deploy the smart contract into the Ethereum blockchain
2:
return contractaddress
3: TAN securely save the contractaddrees to be distributed to the FF members
encrypted files to the FF this FN belongs to. The FN accordingly can retrieve the encrypted
files credentials stored on the smart contract. FNs that are not part of the smart contract
cannot access the encrypted data stored in the Shared-Storage (SS). We developed a smart
contract to enable FNs in the same FF of adding encrypted files credentials and encrypted
secret key (SK) to the smart contract as shown in Algorithm 5.8. This smart contract
allow FNs to add encrypted file’s credentials to the smart contract as follow: the file hash,
index-hash and encrypted (SK). The smart contract verifies whether the FN’s (requestor)
credentials matches the FF’s credentials or not. The FN is incapable of adding encrypted
115

Algorithm 5.6 Fog Federation Creation Smart Contract
1: struct FogFederation{
2:
string FFPK;
3:
string attribute1;
4:
string attribute2;
5:
string[ ] members;
6:
string[ ] fogFederationFiles;
7:
}
8: mapping(string ⇒ string) public fogNodeFFPK; // map FN to FFPK , FN ⇒ FFPK
9: mapping(string ⇒ bool) public setFFPK; // check for uniqueness of FFPK, if FFPK1
is given then set to true,
10: string[] fogFederationsList; // list of fog federations
11: mapping(string ⇒ FogFederation) public mapFFPK; // FFPK ⇒ FF
12: event Fog-Federation-Event(string FFPK, string attribute1, string attribute2, string[]
members, string[ ] files);
13: function createFogFederation (string ffpk, string att1, string att2) public returns(string
FFPK, string attribute1, string attribute2, string[] members, string[] files){
14:
require(msg.sender == TANaddress , ”You are not allowed”);
15:
require(setFFPK[ffpk] == false keccak256(abi.encodePacked
(mapFFPK[ffpk].FFPK)) ==keccak256(abi.encodePacked(””)), ”FFPK already have attributes”);
16:
setFFPK[ffpk] = true;
17:
mapFFPK[ffpk].FFPK = ffpk;
18:
mapFFPK[ffpk].attribute1 = att1;
19:
mapFFPK[ffpk].attribute2 = att2;
20:
fogFederationsList.push(ffpk);
21:
emit GroupEvent(ffpk,mapFFPK[ffpk].attribute1,mapFFPK[ffpk].attribute2,
mapFFPK[ffpk].members,mapFFPK[ffpk].fogFederationFiles);
22:
return(ffpk,
mapFFPK[ffpk].attribute1,
mapFFPK[ffpk].attribute2,
mapFFPK[ffpk].members, mapFFPK[ffpk].groupFiles);
files credentials to the smart contract in case the FN credentials do not match the FF’s
credentials. In addition, this smart contract connects the encrypted file index-hash in the
Shared-Storage (SS), encrypted (SK) and the encrypted file’s hash with the Fog-Federation’s
Attributes.
Algorithm 5.9 introduces the File-Retrieving smart contract. When an FN seeks
retrieving an encrypted-file from the Shared-Storage (SS). The FN starts by invoking the
File-Retrieving smart contract. This approach has introduced two scenarios for encrypted
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data retrieving. First scenario: an FN intends to retrieve an encrypted file while there is
another FN in the same FF has an updated copy of the encrypted file. The FN (requestor)
sends a request to the SC to get the EF cridentials. The SC will return the FN currently in
possession of the encrypted file. Then, the FN queries the EF from the returned FN, next
the request receiver verifies the data requestor by executing the smart contract. If the smart
contract returns that the FN (requestor) is a legitimate member of the FF, the FN(receiver)
will sends the encrypted file to the data requestor. Second scenario: the encrypted-file is in
the SS. The FN (requestor) invokes the smart contract to retrieve the following encryptedfile credentials: file Hash, file index-hash, and the encrypted SK. The smart contract verifies
whether the FN (requestor) identity is authentic or not. If the FN becomes authorized, the
smart contract will return the corresponding file Hash, file index-hash, and the encrypted
SK of the encrypted file.
One of the important contribution of this research is to prevent rogue FNs from
accessing the encrypted data stored either in the SS or in other FN in the same FF. Algorithm
5.10 shows the smart contract to remove the rogue FN from the FF which it can not retrieve
the encrypted file credentials from the smart contract.

5.6

Performance Evaluation and Security Analysis
In this section, the experiment design and the experimental evaluation are provided.

We evaluate the cost of the smart contracts creation followed by the execution cost of their
functions to achieve the blockchain-encrypted-based approach proposed objectives. In particular, we exploit Ethereum’s smart contract technology to oust and prevent the rogue
FNs from accessing encrypted data stored in the Shared-Storage (SS) or in other FN’s offchain storage. We start with providing a security analysis of our approach followed by the
implementation details.
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Algorithm 5.7 adding FN to the FF Smart Contract
1: event FFmemberEvent( stirng FFPK, string attribute1, string attribute2, string[ ] members, string[ ] files)
2: function addFN (string memory FFPK, string memory FNID ) public returns(string memory FFPK, string memory attribute1, string memory attribute2, string[ ] memory members, string[ ] memory files) {
3:
require(msg.sender == TANaddress , ”You are not allowed”);
4:
require(setFFPK[ffpk] == true keccak256(abi.encodePacked(mapFFPK[ffpk].ffpk))
== keccak256(abi.encodePacked(ffpk)), ”FFPK not available”);
5:
require(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(memberFFPK[FNid]))==
keccak256(abi.encodePacked(””)), ”Member already added in FF”);
6:
mapFFPK[ffpk].members.push(FNId);
7:
memberFFPK[FNid] = FFPK;
8:
emit MemberEvent(ffpk, mapFFPK[ffpk].attribute1, mapFFPK[ffpk].attribute2,
mapFFPK[ffpk].members, mapFFPK[FFPK].groupFiles);
9:
return(ffpk,
mapFFPK[ffpk].attribute1,
mapFFPK[ffpk].attribute2,
mapFFPK[ffpk].members, mapFFPK[ffpk].groupFiles); }

Algorithm 5.8 addingFile and Encrypted Secret-Key(SK)
1: event UploadEvent (stirng FFPK, string attribute1, string attribute2, string[ ] members,
string[ ] files)
2: function uploadFileHashAndSK (string FFPK, string senderID ,string filehash, string
fileIndex, string EncryptedSK) public returns (string FFPK, string attribute1, string
attribute2,string [ ] members, string [] files){
3:
require (memberFFPK [senderID ] == FFPK);
4:
require (fileInFF [fileIndex][filehash] == ” ”);
5:
require (fileMapHash [fileIndex][filehash] == ” ”);
6:
require (fileMapHashMapMember [filIndex][EncryptedSK] == ” ”);
7:
fileInFF[filehash] = FFPK;
8:
mapFFPK[FFPK].groupFiles.push(fileHash);
9:
fileMapHash[fileHash][fileIndex] = EncryptedSK;
10:
memberFiles[senderID ].push(fileHash);
11:
memberFiles[senderID ].push(fileIndex);
12:
fileMapHashMember[fileHash][EncryptedSK]=senderID ;
13:
emit UploadEvent (FFPK,mapFFPK [FFPK].attribute1,
14: mapFFPK [FFPK].attribute2, mapFFPK [FFPK].members,
15: mapFFPK[FFPK].groupFiles);
16:
return(FFPK,
mapFFPK[FFPK].attribute1,
mapFFPK[FFPK].attribute2,
mapFFPK[FFPK].members, mapFFPK[FFPK].groupFiles);
17: }

118

Algorithm 5.9 File Retrieving Smart Contract
1: Case 1: Another FN ∈ same FF has copy of the Encrypted-File (EF)
2: FN receives address of the FN has the EF in its off-chain DB, and the file index-hash
plus encrypted SK from SC
3: FN (requestor) sends a request to the FN holding the EF;
4: FN (reciever) invokes the samrt contract to verify the FN (requestor) identity;
5: if FN(requestor) is not verified then
6: decline;
7: else
8: send the EF to the requestor
9: end if
10:
Case 2: Encrypted File is stored in the Shared-Storage (SS)
11: FN (requestor) invoke the samart contract to get the file-hash and the encrypted SK
12: if FN (requestor) attributes and ID are not verified then
13: decline;
14: else
15: return (file-hash in the SS and the encrypted SK)
16: end if
17: FN downloads the EF from the SS using the file-hash
18: FN decrypt the encrypted SK using its FNSK, then decrypt the retrieved EF
Algorithm 5.10 Rogue Fog Node Removing
1: function removeFN(String FFPK, string FN) public{
2:
require(msg.sender == TAN address);
3:
require(memberFFPK[FN]==FFPK);
4:
memberFFPK[FN] = ” ”;
5: emit removeFN(FFPK, FNID ); }
5.6.1

Security Analysis
In this section, we state the security issues that the Blockchain-Encryption-Based

Approach provides solution for. The approach proposed solutions relatively focused on:
rogue FNs, an MIMM attack, and a curious storage service provider. Based on our proposed
approach in 5.4.1, we discuss each of these issues as follow:
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5.6.1.1

Security against Rogue Fog Nodes

In this approach we consider the Fog-Node (FN) a rogue one whenever it submits a
false credentials to the Smart Contract, and accordingly the SC removes the FN from the
FF by decoupling it from the SC. Then, the FN cannot be authorized by the SC. When an
FN encrypts a file, it encrypts it using a random generated Secret-Key (SK), then it uploads
the encrypted file to the Shared-Storage (SS) (e.g. IPFS in this approach). IPFS returns an
idex-hash of the location of the file in the IPFS. Then, the FN encrypts the SK using the
FFPK already posted on the Smart Contract (SC) and uploaded it along with the indexhash of the file to the SC. Meaning no FN can download this file unless providing the correct
index-hash. Any FN has to be verified using the SC to be able to get the Encrypted-File
(EF) credential to be able to retrieve it from the SS. This means that the FN would not be
able to obtain the index-hash, encrypted SK, and the hash of the encrypted file stored in
the Shared-Storage (SS). This feature has been accomplished using the Smart Contracts as
shown in Algorithms 8 and 9 respectively. If the FN fails to obtain authorization through
the SC, it would be reported as a rogue FN and consequently be deleted from the FF, as
shown SC ( Algorithm 10). These features make our approach efficient in protecting end
users’ data confidentiality.

5.6.1.2

Security against MITM Attack

In this approach, the FN computes the hash of the file prior to encryption process, and
the hash is uploaded to the SC along the encrypted file and encrypted SK. All of these are
bonded to the FFPK and the FF’s attributes. Later in future, if another FN goes through the
authorization process via the SC and downloads the Encrypted-File (EF) from the SharedStorage (SS), the FN (data requestor) would be capable of verifying the Encrypted-File (EF)
integrity after decryption process. In addition, every FN in the FF has a FNSK different
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from others but related to the FFPK. In this mean, any party not authorized member of
the FF would not have a FNSK paired to the FFPK. Therefore, they will not be able to
put hand of the encrypted data, but if it happens the FNs that retrieve the encrypted data
would be able to discover the damaged files by checking their hashes. In short, this approach
is subtle regarding the damaged/corrupted files detection.

5.6.1.3

Security against a Curious Shared-Storage Provider

In this solution, the FN (e.g. considered data owner) does not need third party to
distribute the encrypted (SK) used to encrypt data to the other FNs in the FF. It also does
not need to outsource the SK with the Encrypted-Files (EF) to the Shared-Storage (SS)
provider. FNs encrypt SK of each EF with the FFPK and upload it to the blockchain smart
contract; therefore, the SS provider cannot obtain the SK. Moreover, the SS service provider
does not have a copy of the FFPK as it is only public to the FF members. It is obvious that
as long as the Ethereum blockchain smart contract and the FNs’ credentials are safe, this
approach is secure against the curiosity of the storage service provider.

5.6.2

Implementation Details
This section presents the implementation details. Our proposed approach is a com-

bination of the Ciphertext-Attribute-Based-Encryption (CP-ABE) technique and Ethereum
blockchain to fulfill the proposed approach’s objectives. Ethereum blockchain enables developers to program their smart contracts and deploy them on Ethereum platform.

5.6.2.1

Blockchain-Encryption-Based Experiment Design

This experiment aims to evaluate the proposed smart contracts’ feasibility and performance in terms of the amount of gas consumed by the smart contracts’ functions. In
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the Blockchain-Encryption-Based Approach experiment design, we classify the Fog-Nodes
(FNs) into Fog-Federations (FFs) based on their attributes namely locations and services
they provide to end-users. FNs that are in same FF can access and share encrypted data
stored on the Shared-Storage (SS) by invoking the smart contract. We used the Ethereum
Blockchain smart contract for the following reasons: 1) To enable FNs in the same FF to
carry on a distributed authorization process. 2) To store an on-chain access control table,
called Encrypted-Files Tracking-Table, which must be protected from being tampered with
malicious/rogue FNs. As this approach aims to minimize the communication overhead between the SS and FNs, when a FN seeks retrieving an encrypted data from the SS, it must
query the smart contract first, the smart contract would check whether there is a FN in same
FF having an updated copy of the requested file or not. If it is the case, the smart contract
directs the FN (requestor) to obtain the required encrypted file from the FN currently in
possession of the EF. In this case, exploiting the Ethereum smart contract technology here
makes our model robust against falsifying the Encrypted-Files Tracking-Table.
We implemented a prototype of this approach to study its feasibility and performance.
The experimental environment’s configuration is: macOS Mojave 10.14 with an Intel Core i7
CPU 2.2 GHz processor. The RAM is 16 GB. We used the Solidity programming language to
write the smart contracts, and Java programming language to execute the CP-ABE program.
This library provides pairing-based cryptosystems in java.
At the time this research Ethereum solidity does not support Attribute-Based-Encryption
(ABE) algorithms; therefore, we used the the smart contract to monitor the encrypted files
tracking table and executed the algorithms related to the ABE algorithm externally in java
programming language. Algorithms: 1, 2, 3, and 4 are implemented on java but do nothing with the smart contracts. In the CP-ABE program, we used the Java Pairing-Based
Cryptography (JPBC) library used in []. Algorithms: 5-10 are the smart contracts of this
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approach which we developed using Solidity programming language.
We used a lightweight java library called web3j [] for clients integration on the
Ethereum network. Developers use web3j to evaluate the time takes to publish the the
smart contract.
We also used Ganache which is a blockchain based emulator used to simulate a personal Ethereum Blockchain. It is used for testing solidity smart contracts[].

5.6.2.2

The Blockchain-Encryption Approach Setup

The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is used as Shared-Storage (SS). The FNs are
simulated as clients which grouped into FFs by their attributes. One of these FNs nominated
as a Trusted Authority Node (TAN) in each FF. Algorithms: 1, 2, 3, and 4 are simulated on
java. We developed Algorithms 5-10 as smart contracts and deployed on a private ethereum
blockchain.
The smart contract stores the following credentials of each Fog-Federation (FF): FogNode-Identity (FNID ), EFID , attribute set, FNatt−sig , and off-chain database content of each
FN. It also maintains the cryptographic keys of each FF, such as Fog-Federation-Public-Key
(FFPK). It also maintains a set of encrypted files FF’s members are able to access.
In addition, the smart contract comprises a set of credentials about each EncryptedFile (EF) upon being uploaded to the SS. These credentials are: the returned hash address of
the SS, the hash of the EF before being encrypted, and the secret key used in the encryption
process by the FN in an encrypted format. All of these information are protected from being
tempered with by being stored on the Ethereum smart contract.
In this research, we try to minimize the communication overhead between the SharedStorage (SS) and the FNs. Therefore, we equipped the smart contract with a list of FNs
and what EF they currently have in their off-ChainDB. The smart would check the list upon
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receiving a request from a FN to retrieve a certain EF. The smart returns the EF’s credentials
and the FN currently in possession of the EF. The smart contract considers the EF in the
off-chainDB valid only for period of time. This is because the approach cannot guarantee
the FNs from going rogue and then poisoning the EF they currently in possession of. On
the other hand, if the smart contract verifies the FN (requestor) but no FN in the same
FF currently has an updated copy of the requested EF, the smart contract is programmed
to return the EF’s credentials as the FN (requestor) can download the required EF from
the SS. However, as the Fog Computing was introduced to minimize the time latency and
communication overhead between the cloud and end-devices, this approach satisfies less
communication between the SS and FNs by construction.
When a FN (data requestor) does not pass the smart contract verification process, it
is considered a rogue FN and then the smart contract decouples this FN from the FF as it
becomes incapable to accessing the encrypted files anymore. FNs that belong to other FFs
or provide mistaken request input to the smart contract will not be able to circumvent the
blockchain smart contract.

5.6.2.3

The Blockchain-Encryption Approach Experimental Evaluation

At the time of simulating this approach’s Smart Contracts (SC), 1 ether price was
equal to 191$. The gas price was equal 2Gwei which 1Gwei = 10−9 ether. The cost takes our
smart contracts to execute the functions are given in Table 5.2. The transaction cost refers
to the required amount of gas to post the data on the blockchain network. The execution
cost refers to the function execution computational fee.
The Ethereum platform does not support Attribute-Based-Encryption (ABE) algorithms at the time of this research. Therefor, we executed Algorithms 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4
on external environment. In this approach, we merely use the smart contract for managing
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encrypted data access policies among FNs in same FF.
The smart contract is deployed by deploying Algorithm 5.5 to the Ethereum blockchain.
The deployment process returns the smart contract address which authorized FNs have to
use whenever to query the smart contract to perform any function. As shown in Table 5.2,
the SC Deployment operation costed 0.1661432 ether which equals to 57.81 USD.
For each FF, we externally generated the following: Fog-Federation-Public-Key (FFPK),
and Attributes (e.g. FNs locations and services provided by the FN in the FF). Then, the
TAN invokes the Fog-Federation Creation Smart Contract to perform makeFF() function
that posts the FF credentials to the blockchain. In this work, we grouped the FFs by their
attributes. Each set of attributes is paired to a FFPK. When a TAN invokes the smart
contract to making a FF, this performed function costed 0.0779918 ether which equals to
27.14 USD.
When a new FN joins the system, the TAN would add it to the corresponding FF by
invoking adding FN to the FF Smart Contract. This smart contract performs an addFN()
function. In this step, the smart contract stores the FNID , the FF this FN belongs to, the
FFPK, and the FF attributes. This function costed 0.0338856 ether which equals to 11.79
USD.
This approach is basically invented to prevent rogue FNs from accessing the encrypted
data stored in the Shared-Storage (SS). Suppose a FN has a file to be encrypted and uploaded
to the SS. Let’s consider this FN got ousted for technical or malicious reasons. In this
case, we are not benefiting from the fog computing features. Therefore, the Fog-Federation
idea plays a great role here by maintaining data availability to the end-users. When a FN
seeks encrypting a file and uploads it the SS, it follows the following steps: 1) Performing
the hashing and encryption process externally by executing Algorithm 5.4. Then, the FN
encrypts the Secret-Key (SK) that was used to encrypt the file using the FFPK. Next, it
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uploads the Encrypted-File (EF) to the SS which is the IPFS in this research. The IPFS
returns the index-hash of the uploaded EF. Consequently, the FN invokes the addingFile
and Encrypted Secret-Key(SK) Smart Contract (SS) to upload the encrypted file credentials
to the blockchain as: (EFID , Encrypted (SK), File hash, Index-hash). This smart contract
executes the upload File Index-Hash And SK function. This function costed 0.0854764 ether
which equals to 29.74 USD. In addition, it will add the file hash. This would be carried out
by executing add file hash function, and this function costed 0.081512 ether which equals to
28.36 USD.
When a FN in the FF seeks retrieving an Encrypted File (EF) from the SS, FN
(requestor) invokes the File-Retrieving Smart Contract. This SC checks whether another FN
in the same FF has a copy or not. If the FN (requestor) passes the SC identity validation
check, and another FN in the same FF has an updated copy of the required EF, the SS
returns the EF credentials that are the encrypted (SK), EF-Hash, and the idex-hash plus
the identity of the FN currently has the EF in its off-chain-DB. When the FN (requestor)
sends the requestor the FN, in which has a copy of the EF, the FN (receiver) would query
the SC to validate the FN (requestor) identity. On the other hand, if the required EF is not
available in any of the FF’s members off-chain database, the FN (requestor) will download
the EF from the SS, which is the IPFS in this model) using the index-hash received from the
SC. The SC accomplished this by performing the Getting SK and index-hash function which
costed 0.0370896 ether which equals to 12.90 USD. In addition, when any FN (requestor) is
verified by the system, the verifying-FN function is provoked and it costed 0.0409558 ether
which equals to 14.25 USD.
In addition to the ability of this approach to verify FNs (data requestors) before
putting hands on the encrypted data, it is capable to ousting the rogue/malicious FNs upon
receiving incorrect credentials from the FN upon provoking any of the SC’s functions. When
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Table 5.2: Smart Contract and Functions Test Cost)
SC/Function
SC Deployment
Fog Federation Creation
Adding FN to FF
Add File Index and SK
Add File Hash
Getting SK and file index
Remove FN from FF
Verifying FN by attribute

Gas Used
4153581
1949796
847139
2136909
2037800
927240
806318
952460

Cost in (ether)
0.1661432
0.0779918
0.0338856
0.0854764
0.081512
0.0370896
0.0322527
0.0409558

USD($)
57.81
27.14
11.79
29.74
28.36
12.90
11.22
14.25

the FN does not pass the validation process (verifying FN function), the SC instantaneously
provokes the Rogue Fog Node Removing Smart Contract which decouples the rogue FN
from the FF smart contract which become inaccessible to the rogue FN. So that, rogue
FNs, that are not authorized and authenticated by the SC, requests will be discarded the
SC. This would be accomplished by performing removeFN() function that costed 0.0322527
ether which equals to 11.22 USD.

5.7

Discussion
The security analysis in subsection 5.6.1 shows our approach ability to provide se-

cure environment for end-users’ data travelled among Fog-Nodes (FNs) in same FF, and
between FNs and Shared-Storage (SS) providers. In particular, this approach provides the
main objectives of information security that are: data confidentiality, data integrity, and
data availability. In this approach, we exploited the Ethereum blockchain smart contract
technology to store the On-chain File Tracking Table 5.1 on the smart contract and prevent
register and prevent any modification of it performed by FN unless being authenticated by
the smart contract. In addition, the FNs in same FF authenticate and verify each other
using the smart contract and this is considered as a decentralization as there is no third
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party we need to trust. The meant of this approach was not to develop a high performance
approach, but rather it was to show its feasibility and applicability by showing its ability
in protecting data security by ousting rogue FNs. In addition, as this approach focus on
the channel between the cloud storage and fog nodes, we considered the channels between
end-devices and the fog nodes secured. Besides, in this approach, if a FN provides false
information when querying the smart contract, it is considered a rogue one and accordingly
it is removed from the smart contract and that would lead to its incapability of accessing
the encrypted data to the FF.

5.8

Applications
This section illustrates some of the applications in which this approach could be

exploited to protect end users data security. We provide one example as follow:
This approach could be exploited in hospitals as follow. Suppose every hospital has
multiple Fog-Nodes (FNs) (e.g. Fog-Node(FN) for each clinic) characterized by attributes:
health-service, hospital’s name. Those FNs considered as a Fog-Federation (FF). Patients
records would be stored in the Shared-Storage (SS). Doctors can outsource patients information to the FN of the clinic for processing and further outsource to the SS for storage.
FN holds the Encrypted-File (EF) for a specific time,after outsourcing it to the SS, in which
it could be requested by another FN in same FF. Every FN in the hospital is registered to
the Ethereum blockchain smart contract. When a certain doctor requested a certain private
data from the clinic FN, the FN would query the smart contract for obtaining the required
file address in the SS and its hash, and the encrypted Secret-Key (SK). If the smart contract
verifies the FN, it will return the EF credentials to the FN. If another department FN in the
same hospital has an updated copy of the EF, the smart contract return the address of the
FN having the updated copy of the required file. Otherwise, the FN will get the EF from the
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SS. Exploiting the smart contract concept would help FNs in same hospital to authenticate
each other with tracking the actions provided by each FN. To illustrate, posting all actions
on the blockchain smart contract would help in tracing any malicious event taking by a FN.
We believe that applying this approach into hospitals would increase the level of patients’
data security independently from trusted third party.

5.9

Conclusion
As an effort to allow Fog-Nodes (FNs) in same Fog-Federation (FF) to carry on a

distributed authorization process, and to provide fine-grained data access control with no
depending on a third party. We deployed an On-chain File Tracking Table to monitor the
actions of FNs in same FF for a purpose of preventing rogue FNs from accessing the encrypted
data stored either in another FN in same FF or in the Shared-Storage. This approach
provides data security by providing analysis for that, namely: confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. Functions that are important to fulfill this approach were
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6

Conclusion

In this chapter, we start by showing our approaches’ contributions against the current
literature approaches. Then, we conclude this dissertation.

6.1

Approaches’ Features Comparison
Table.6.1 shows the contributions of our approaches against literature available ap-

proaches in terms of provided features by each approach.
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Table 6.1: Comparison between Our Approaches and Approaches from Literature
Features
Schemes
FF FFSG Confidentiality Integrity Availability
Authentication Process
Access Control Rogue Fog Node Detection and Ousting
Encryption-Based
X ×
X
X
X
Digital Signature
Fine-grained
Ousting
Multi-Level
X X
X
X
X
Digital Signature
Fine-grained
Ousting
Encryption-Blockchain-Based X ×
X
X
X
Decentralized using Ethereum Smart Contract
Fine-grained
Detection and Ousting
[96]
× ×
X
×
×
Digital Signature
Fine-grained
×
[97]
× ×
X
×
×
Authenticate nodes by hashing request message Using Access Key
×
[44]
× ×
×
×
X
Challenge-response Mechanism
×
×
[45]
× ×
X
×
X
Digital signature
Fine-Grained
Revoking Users’ Attributes
[76]
× ×
×
×
×
Challenge response technique and PKI method
×
Detecting rogue vehicle
[79]
× ×
×
×
×
×
×
Detecting rogue AP using round trip time
[71]
× ×
X
X
×
×
×
×
[53]
× ×
X
×
×
Certificate
Fine-grained
Revoking users’ attributes
[54]
× ×
X
×
X
ABS
Fine-grained
×
[98]
× ×
X
×
×
Multi-authority CP-ABE method
Fine-grained
×
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6.2

Conclusion
This dissertation discussed the services that fog computing provides to individuals

and organizations. Besides, it discussed the reasons behind the emergence of the fog computing paradigm. The dissertation then pointed out the security issues that could face
individuals’ and organizations’ confidential data while being stored in fog nodes or the cloud
or transit between the fog computing nodes and the cloud service providers. We summarized
the malicious actors’ impact on these confidential data. This dissertation focused on the issues related to rogue fog nodes, Man-in-the-Middle interceptors, and curious cloud service
providers in the context of fog computing. We provided the potential methods in which those
actors would violate individuals’ and organizations’ security. Through this dissertation, we
focused on securing data in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
This dissertation introduced three main contributions: Encryption-Based Approach,
Multi-Level Approach, and a Blockchain-Encryption-Based Approach. First, Encryptionbased Approach is a system that introduced the idea of Fog-Federation (FF) by grouping fog
nodes that share the same attributed (location and services they provide) into fog federations.
This approach manages to oust the rogue Fog-Nodes (FNs), so they become incapable of
accessing the encrypted data in the cloud or other FNs in the same FF. It also manages to
allow other FNs in the same FF to access the re-encrypted data with no latency. EncryptionBased Approach splits the file to be encrypted into blocks to reduce the communication time
and communication overhead between the Cloud-Service-Provider (CSP) and Fog-Nodes
(FNs) in FF. This approach allows the CSP to track what each fog node currently has/needs.
Our experiment showed that splitting files to be encrypted into blocks is statistically faster
than for whole files. This method helped in minimizing the communication overhead between
the CSP and FFs.
Second, the Multi-level Approach utilized a CP-ABE and hashing cryptographic
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primitives to reduce data breaching by rogue fog nodes. This approach designed the FogFederation-Subgroups (FFSG) of Fog-Nodes (FNs) in the same FF. Further, this scheme
splits files to be encrypted into blocks based on data sensitivity. Then, FNs are placed on
FFSGs based on their access rights given to them. This means, if one fog node goes rogue,
as no fog node in the FFSGs can access all blocks of the encrypted file, the amount of data in
danger of being breached by this rogue node is minimized. FN cannot access the encrypted
data of other FFSG unless satisfying the attributes of the FF and FFSG. In this scheme,
the CSP maintains a progress list called Encrypted Files Tracking Table to demonstrate
each FN’s possession in the Fog-Federation (FF). We designed algorithms to fulfill this approach’s objectives. Then we provided a correctness proof of our encryption and decryption
algorithms. Besides, we provided a security analysis followed by our experiments. Our experiments showed that the idea of Fog-Federation-Subgroups (FFSGs) helps in minimizing
the data that are in danger from being breached by rogue fog nodes.
Third, a Blockchain-Encryption-Based Approach is an approach designed to oust
rogue fog node and minimize the communication overhead between the CSP and FNs
by integrating the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based-Encryption (CP-ABE) algorithm and
blockchain technology. We adopted blockchain in this approach as a medium to store an
on-chain tracking table to verify the identity of each fog node in the fog federation using the
smart contract before they could access the encrypted data on the CSP. In this approach,
blockchain helps prevent the fog nodes from maliciously changing the on-chain tracking table; if such a change detected, the FN that issues the request is reported as a rogue fog node.
In this approach, we used the IPFS as shared storage, and we simulated the blockchain using
the Ethereum smart contract. In our experiment, we showed the feasibility and applicability
of this approach by simulation. Then, we showed that this approach satisfied the proposed
objectives because the consumption gas takes the smart contract to perform the approach’s
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functions should be affordable to FNs.
Our approaches in this dissertation focused on the cloud and fog computing levels.
In our future research, we will focus on providing a holistic approach to serve all levels (e.g.,
end-users devices-fog-cloud).
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